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Abstract
We consider a multi-round auction setting motivated by pay-per-click auctions for Internet advertis-
ing. In each round the auctioneer selects an advertiser and shows her ad, which is then either clicked
or not. An advertiser derives value from clicks; the value of a click is her private information. Ini-
tially, neither the auctioneer nor the advertisers have any information about the likelihood of clicks on
the advertisements. The auctioneer’s goal is to design a (dominant strategies) truthful mechanism that
(approximately) maximizes the social welfare.
If the advertisers bid their true private values, our problem is equivalent to the multi-armed bandit
problem, and thus can be viewed as a strategic version of the latter. In particular, for both problems
the quality of an algorithm can be characterized by regret, the difference in social welfare between the
algorithm and the benchmark which always selects the same “best” advertisement. We investigate how
the design of multi-armed bandit algorithms is affected by the restriction that the resulting mechanism
must be truthful. We find that deterministic truthful mechanisms have certain strong structural properties
– essentially, they must separate exploration from exploitation – and they incur much higher regret
than the optimal multi-armed bandit algorithms. Moreover, we provide a truthful mechanism which
(essentially) matches our lower bound on regret.
ACM Categories and subject descriptors: F.2.2 [Analysis of Algorithms and Problem Complexity]:
Nonnumerical Algorithms and Problems; K.4.4 [Computers and Society]: Electronic Commerce; F.1.2
[Computation by Abstract Devices]: Modes of Computation—Online computation; J.4 [Social and Be-
havioral Sciences]: Economics
General Terms: theory, algorithms, economics.
Keywords: mechanism design, truthful mechanisms, single-parameter auctions, pay-per-click auctions,
multi-armed bandits, regret.
∗This is a full version of a conference paper published in 10th ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce (EC), 2009. Apart from the
revised presentation, this version is updated to reflect the follow-up work [9, 56, 22, 48] and the current snapshot of open questions.
†This research was done while Y. Sharma was a student at Cornell University and an intern at Microsoft Research Silicon Valley.
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1 Introduction
In recent years there has been much interest in understanding the implication of strategic behavior on the
performance of algorithms whose input is distributed among selfish agents. This study was mainly moti-
vated by the Internet, the main arena of large scale interaction of agents with conflicting goals. The field
of Algorithmic Mechanism Design [40] studies the design of mechanisms in computational settings (for
background see the recent book [41] and survey [47]).
Much attention has been drawn to the market for sponsored search (e.g. [31, 19, 55, 36, 2]), a multi-
billion dollar market with numerous auctions running every second. Research on sponsored search mostly
focus on equilibria of the Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction [19, 55], the auction that is most com-
monly used in practice (e.g. by Google and Bing), or on the design of truthful auctions [1]. All these auctions
rely on knowing the rates at which users click on the different advertisements (a.k.a. click-through rates, or
CTRs), and do not consider the process in which these CTRs are learned or refined over time by observing
users’ behavior. We argue that strategic agents would take this process into account, as it influences their
utility. While prior work [24] focused on the influence of click fraud on methods for learning CTRs, we
are interested in the implications of the strategic bidding by the agents. Thus, we consider the problem of
designing truthful sponsored search auctions when the process of learning the CTRs is a part of the game.
We are mainly interested in the interplay between the online learning and the strategic bidding. To
isolate this issue, we consider the following setting, which is a natural strategic version of the multi-armed
bandit (MAB) problem. In this setting, there are k ≥ 2 agents. Each agent i has a single advertisement, and
a private value vi > 0 for every click she gets. The mechanism is an online algorithm that first solicits bids
from the agents, and then runs for T rounds. In each round the mechanism picks an agent (using the bids
and the clicks observed in the past rounds), displays her advertisement, and receives a feedback – if there
was a click or not. Payments are charged after round T . Each agent tries to maximize her own utility: the
value that she derives from clicks minus the payment she pays. We assume that initially no information is
known about the likelihood of each agent to be clicked, and in particular there are no Bayesian priors.
We are interested in designing mechanisms which are truthful (in dominant strategies): every agent
maximizes her utility by bidding truthfully, for any bids of the others and for any clicks that would have
been received (that is, for any realization of the clicks an agent never regrets being truthful in retrospect).
The goal is to maximize the social welfare.1 Since the payments cancel out, this is equivalent to maximizing
the total value derived from clicks, where an agent’s contribution to that total is her private value times the
number of clicks she receives. We call this setting the MAB mechanism design problem.
In the absence of strategic behavior this problem reduces to a standard MAB formulation in which an
algorithm repeatedly chooses one of the k alternatives (“arms”) and observes the associated payoff: the
value-per-click of the corresponding ad if the ad is clicked, and 0 otherwise. The crucial aspect in MAB
problems is the tradeoff between acquiring more information (exploration) and using the current information
to choose a good agent (exploitation). MAB problems have been studied intensively for the past three
decades. In particular, the above formulation is well-understood [6, 7, 16] in terms of regret relative to the
benchmark which always chooses the same “best” alternative (time-invariant benchmark). This notion of
regret naturally extends to the strategic setting outlined above, the total payoff being exactly equal to the
social welfare, and the regret being exactly the loss in social welfare relative to the time-invariant benchmark.
Thus one can directly compare MAB algorithms and MAB mechanisms in terms of welfare loss (regret).
Broadly, we ask how the design of MAB algorithms is affected by the restriction of truthfulness: what is
the difference between the best algorithms and the best truthful mechanisms? We are interested both in terms
of the structural properties and the gap in performance (in terms of regret). In short, we establish that the
1Social welfare includes both the auctioneer’s revenue and the agents’ utility. Since in practice different sponsored search plat-
forms compete against one another, taking into account the agents’ utility increases the platform’s attractiveness to the advertisers.
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additional constraints imposed by truthfulness severely limit the structure and performance of online learn-
ing algorithms. We are not aware of any prior work that characterizes truthful online learning algorithms or
proves negative results on their performance.
Discussion. We believe that the fundamental limitations of truthfulness are best studied in simple models
such as the one defined above. We did not attempt to incorporate many additional aspects of pay-per-click
ad auctions such as information that is revealed to and by agents over time, multiple ad slots, user contexts,
ad features, etc. However, intuition from our impossibility results applies to richer models, and for some of
these models it is not difficult to produce precise corollaries. The key idea in the simple truthful mechanism
that we present (separating exploration and exploitation) can be easily extended as well.
We consider a strong notion of truthfulness: bidding truthfully is optimal for every possible click real-
ization (and bids of others). This notion is attractive as it does not require the agents to be risk neutral with
respect to the randomness inherent in clicks, or consider their beliefs about the CTRs. It allows for the CTRs
to change over time, and still incentivizes agents to be truthful. Moreover, an agent never regrets truthful
bidding in retrospect. It is desirable to understand what can be achieved with this notion before moving to
weaker notions, and thus we focus on this notion in this paper.
1.1 Our contributions
We present two main contributions: structural characterizations of (dominant-strategy) deterministic truthful
mechanisms, and lower bounds on the regret that such mechanisms must suffer. The regret suffered by
truthful mechanisms is significantly larger than the regret of the best MAB algorithms. We emphasize
that our characterization results hold regardless of whether the mechanism’s goal is to maximize welfare,
revenue, or any other objective.
Formally, a mechanism for the MAB mechanism design problem is a pair (A,P), where A is the al-
location rule (essentially, an MAB algorithm which also gets the bids as input), and P is the payment rule
that determines how much to charge each agent. Both rules can depend only on the observable quantities:
submitted bids and click events (clicks or non-clicks) for ads that have been displayed by the algorithm.
Since the allocation rule is an online algorithm, its decision in a given round can only depend on the click
events observed in the past.
The distinction between an allocation rule and a payment rule is essential in prior work on Mechanism
Design, and it is also essential for this paper. In particular, social welfare (and therefore regret) is completely
determined by the allocation rule. This is because welfare includes each payment twice, with opposite signs:
amount paid by an advertiser and amount received by the mechanism, and the two cancel out.
Characterization. The MAB mechanisms setting is a single-parameter auction, the most studied and
well-understood type of auctions. For such settings truthful mechanisms are fully characterized [38, 3]: a
mechanism is truthful if and only if the allocation rule is monotone (by increasing her bid an agent cannot
cause a decrease in the number of clicks she gets), and the payment rule is defined in a specific and, essen-
tially, unique way. Yet, we observe that this characterization is not the right characterization for the MAB
setting! The main problem is that if an agent is not chosen in a given round then the corresponding click
event is not observed by the mechanism, in the sense that the mechanism does not know whether this agent
would have received a click had it been selected in this round. Therefore the payment cannot depend on
any such unobserved click events. This is a non-trivial restriction because the naive payment computation
according to the formula mandated by [38, 3] requires simulating the run of the allocation rule for bids
different than the ones actually submitted, which in turn may depend on unobserved click events. We show
that this restriction has severe implications on the structure of truthful mechanisms.
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The first notable necessary property of a truthful MAB mechanism is a much stronger version of mono-
tonicity which we call “pointwise monotonicity”:
Definition 1.1. A click realization consists of click information for all agents and all rounds: it specifies
whether a given agent receives a click if it is selected in a given round.2 An allocation rule is pointwise
monotone if for each click realization, each bid profile and each round, if an agent is selected at this round,
then she is also selected after increasing her bid (fixing everything else).
We first consider the case of two agents and show that truthful MAB mechanisms must have a strict
separation between exploration and exploitation, in the following sense. A crucial feature of exploration is
the ability to influence the allocation in forthcoming rounds. To make this point more concrete, we call a
round t influential for a given click realization, with influenced agent j, if for some bid profile changing the
click realization for this round can affect the allocation of agent j in some future round. We show that in
any influential round, the allocation can not depend on the bids. Thus, we show that influential rounds are
essentially useless for exploitation.
Definition 1.2. An MAB allocation rule A is called exploration-separated if for any click realization, the
allocation in any influential round does not depend on the bids.
In our model, agents derive value from clicks. In particular, an agent with zero value per click receives no
value. We focus on mechanisms in which a truthfully bidding agent with zero value-per-click pays exactly
zero; we call such mechanisms normalized. Among truthful single-parameter mechanisms, normalized
mechanisms are precisely the ones that satisfy two desirable properties: voluntary participation (truthfully
bidding agents never lose from participating), and no positive transfers (advertisers are charged, not paid).
We also make a mild assumption that an allocation rule is scale-free: invariant under multiplying all
bids by the same positive number, i.e. does not depend on the choice of the currency unit. Many MAB
algorithms from prior work can be easily converted into scale-free MAB allocation rules via some generic
ways to incorporate bids into algorithms’ specification.3
We are now ready to present our main structural result for two agents.
Theorem 1.3. Consider the MAB mechanism design problemwith two agents. Let A be a non-degenerate,4
deterministic, scale-free allocation rule. Then a mechanism (A,P) is normalized and truthful for some
payment rule P if and only if A is pointwise monotone and exploration-separated.
The case of more than two agents requires slightly more refined notions.
Definition 1.4. For a given realization and bid profile, a round is secured from an agent if that agent cannot
change the allocation at that round by increasing his bid. A deterministic MAB allocation rule is called
weakly separated if for every click realization and bid profile, if a round is influential for this realization and
bid profile, then it is secured from every agent that this round influences.
2Note that an MAB mechanism does not observe the entire click realization: it only observes click information for one agent
per round, the agent that was selected in this round.
3Many algorithms from prior work on stochastic MAB maintain an estimate νi of the expected reward for each arm i, such as
an upper confidence bound in UCB1 [6] or an independent sample from Bayesian posterior in Thompson’s Heuristic [54], so that
the algorithms’ decisions depend only on these estimates. An allocation rule can interpret νi as an estimate of the CTR, and use
ν′i = bi νi instead of νi for all decisions. Moreover, any MAB algorithm can be converted to a scale-free MAB allocation rule by
assigning a reward of bi/(maxj bj) to each agent i for each click on her ad. We use both approaches in this paper, in Section 5 and
Section 6.1, respectively.
4Non-degeneracy is a mild technical assumption, formally defined in “preliminaries”, which ensures that (essentially) if a given
allocation happens for some bid profile (bi, b−i) then the same allocation happens for all bid profiles (x, b−i), where x ranges over
some non-degenerate interval. Without this assumption, all structural results hold (essentially) almost surely w.r.t the k-dimensional
Lebesgue measure on the bid vectors. Exposition becomes significantly more cumbersome, yet leads to the same lower bounds on
regret. For clarity, we assume non-degeneracy throughout this paper.
4
The “weakly separated” condition is weaker than “exploration-separated”: while the latter ensures that
all agents cannot change the allocation at any given influential round t, the former only requires this for each
agent that is influenced by round t, fixing the bids of all other agents. For two agents and a scale-free MAB
allocation rule, the two conditions are equivalent.
Our complete characterization for any number of agents follows.
Theorem 1.5. Consider the MAB mechanism design problem. Let A be a non-degenerate deterministic
allocation rule. Then a mechanism (A,P) is normalized and truthful for some payment rule P if and only
if A is pointwise monotone and weakly separated.
Note that the general characterization does not require the allocation rule to be scale-free. In the special
case of two agents and scale-free allocation rules it implies Theorem 1.3.
We also investigate under which assumptions a weakly separated MAB allocation rule is exploration-
separated, as the latter condition is sufficient for proving performance limitations (bounds on regret). To this
end, we adapt a well-known notion from the literature on Social Choice, called Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives (IIA, for short): an MAB allocation rule is IIA if for any given click realization, bid profile and
round, a change of bid of agent i cannot transfer the allocation in this round from agent j to agent l, where
these are three distinct agents. Note that the IIA condition trivially holds if there are only two agents. We
prove that for a non-degenerate deterministic allocation rule which is scalefree, pointwise monotone, and
satisfies IIA it holds that the rule is exploration-separated if and only if it is weakly separated. Technically,
assuming IIA allows us to extend our performance limitations results to more than two agents.5
Lower bounds on regret. In view of the characterizations of truthful mechanisms, we present a lower
bound on the performance of exploration-separated algorithms. We consider a setting, termed the stochastic
MAB mechanism design problem, in which each click on a given advertisement is an independent random
event which happens with a fixed probability, a.k.a. the CTR. The expected “payoff” from choosing a given
agent is her private value times her CTR. For the ease of exposition, assume that the bids lie in the interval
[0, 1]. Then the non-strategic version is the stochastic MAB problem in which the payoff from choosing a
given arm i is an independent sample in [0, 1] with a fixed mean µi. In both versions, we compete with
the best-fixed-arm benchmark: the hypothetical allocation rule (resp. algorithm) that always chooses an
arm with the maximal expected payoff. This benchmark is standard in the literature on stochastic MAB; it is
optimal among all MAB algorithms that are given the expected rewards for each arms (resp., among all MAB
allocation rules that are given the bids and the CTRs). We define regret as the expected difference between
the social welfare (resp. total payoff) of the benchmark and that of the allocation rule (resp. algorithm). The
algorithm’s goal is to minimize R(T ), worst-case regret over all problem instances on T rounds.
We show that the worst-case regret of any exploration-separated algorithm is larger than that of the
optimal MAB algorithm [7]: Ω(T 2/3) vs. O(
√
T ) for a fixed number of agents. We obtain an even more
pronounced difference if we restrict our attention to the δ-gap problem instances: instances for which the
best agent is better than the second-best by a (comparatively large) amount δ, that is µ1v1 − µ2v2 = δ ·
(maxi vi), where arms are arranged such that µ1v1 ≥ µ2v2 ≥ · · · ≥ µkvk. Such problem instances are
known to be easy for the MAB algorithms. Namely, an MAB algorithm can concurrently achieve the optimal
worst-case regret O(
√
kT log T ) and regret O(kδ log T ) on δ-gap instances [32, 6]. However, we show
5Since prior work on MAB algorithms did not address strategic issues, these algorithms were not designed to satisfy properties
like (pointwise) monotonicity and IIA (and besides, these properties are not even well-defined for MAB algorithms, only for MAB
allocation rules). So it is not yet clear how limiting are these properties. The simple pointwise monotone MAB allocation rule
described later in the Introduction does satisfy IIA, but suffers from high regret. Designing better-performing MAB allocation
rules that are (pointwise) monotone appears quite challenging. For instance, such allocation rule is one of the main results in the
follow-up paper [9]. We leave open the question of existence of low-regret MAB allocation rules that are both pointwise-monotone
and IIA.
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that for exploration-separated allocation algorithms the worst-case regret Rδ(T ) over the δ-gap instances
is polynomial in T (rather than poly-logarithmic in T ) as long as worst-case regret is even remotely non-
trivial (i.e., sublinear). Thus, for the δ-gap instances the gap in the worst-case regret between unrestricted
algorithms and exploration-separated algorithms is exponential in T .
Theorem 1.6. Consider the stochastic MAB mechanism design problem with k ≥ 2 agents. LetA be a deter-
ministic allocation rule that is exploration-separated. Then A has worst-case regret R(T ) = Ω(k1/3 T 2/3).
Moreover, if R(T ) = O(T γ) for some γ < 1 then for every fixed δ ≤ 14 and any ǫ > 0 the worst-case regret
over the δ-gap instances is Rδ(T ) = Ω(δ T 2(1−γ)−ǫ).
For two agents, Theorem 1.6 implies a significant gap in performance between truthful MAB mecha-
nisms and the best MAB algorithms, since truthful MAB mechanisms are necessarily exploration-separated.6
For example, while truthful MAB mechanisms suffer regret of Ω(T 2/3), the best algorithms have regret of
only O(
√
T ); as we described above, for δ-gap distances the difference in regret is even more pronounced.
For more than two agents, Theorem 1.6 does not immediately imply any regret bounds for truthful
MAB mechanisms. This is because the theorem requires the “exploration-separated” condition, whereas
the corresponding characterization result in Theorem 1.5 only guarantees the “weakly separated” condition.
Recall that one way to guarantee the “exploration-separated” condition (and therefore the regret bound) is
to furthermore assume IIA. It is an open question whether one can prove similar regret bounds for weakly
separated MAB allocation rules without assuming IIA.
We note that our lower bounds hold for a more general setting in which the values-per-click can change
over time, and the advertisers are allowed to change their bids at every time step.
Somewhat counter-intuitively, the lower bound on regret for k = 2 agents does not immediately imply
the same lower bound for any constant k > 2. This is, essentially, because our setting requires a mechanism
to show an ad in each round. A seemingly obvious approach to extend the lower bound from k = 2 to
(say) k = 3 is to assume, for the sake of contradiction, that there exists a truthful MAB mechanism M for
3 agents whose regret is less than the lower bound for two agents, and use M construct a truthful MAB
mechanism M′ for two agents with the same regret. (This would yield a contradiction, and hence prove
the lower bound for three agents.) The derived two-agent mechanism M′ adds a fictitious third agent (a
dummy) that never receives any clicks, and runs the original three-agent mechanism M. However, whenM
picks the dummy agent, the two-agent mechanism must pick one of the two real agents. These additional
allocations may distort the agents’ incentives, so M′ is not guaranteed to be truthful. Hence, this reduction
is not guaranteed to work. Likewise, the allocation rule ofM′ is not guaranteed to be weakly separated even
if the allocation rule of M is exploration-separated. Thus, we cannot immediately obtain a lower bound on
regret for more than two agents simply by combining the two-agent characterization in Theorem 1.3 and the
two-agent regret bound of Theorem 1.6.
Tightness: a positive result. To complete the picture for exploration-separated MAB allocation rules, we
present a very simple deterministic mechanism that is truthful and normalized, and matches the lower bound
R(T ) = Ω(k1/3 T 2/3) up to logarithmic factors. The allocation rule in this mechanism is exploration-
separated; it consists of two phases: an exploration phase in which agents are chosen in a round-robin
fashion, followed by an exploitation phase which allocates all rounds to the agent with the best empirical
performance in the exploration phase. Crucially, the duration of the exploration phase is fixed in advance
(and optimized given k and T ).
6Formally, this holds for truthful MAB allocation rules with allocation rules that satisfy the mild assumptions of non-degeneracy
and scale-freeness. We remove the latter assumption in one of the extensions.
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Extensions. We extend our main results in several directions.
1. We derive a lower bound on regret for deterministic truthful mechanisms without assuming that the
allocations are scale-free. In particular, for two agents there are no assumptions. This lower bound
holds for any k (the number of agents) assuming IIA. However, the value of the lower bound does not
increase with k; in this sense this lower bound is weaker than the one in Theorem 1.6.
2. We consider randomized MAB mechanisms that are universally truthful, i.e. truthful for each realiza-
tion of the internal random seed. We extend the Ω(k1/3 T 2/3) lower bounds on regret to mechanisms
that randomize over exploration-separated deterministic MAB allocation rules.
3. We consider randomized MAB mechanisms under a weaker (less restrictive) version of truthfulness: a
mechanism is weakly truthful if for each click realization, it is truthful in expectation over its random
seed. We show that any randomized allocation that is pointwise monotone and satisfies a certain stong
notion of “separation between exploration and exploitation” can be turned into a mechanism that is
weakly truthful and normalized.
We apply this result to the version of the MAB mechanism design problem in which the clicks are
chosen by an oblivious adversary.7 (The corresponding algorithmic version is the adversarial MAB
problem [7, 14].) Using an MAB algorithm from the literature [8, 28], we obtain a weakly truthful
MAB mechanism for this problem with regret O((k log k)1/3 · T 2/3). This matches our lower bound
for deterministic MAB mechanisms up to (log k)1/3 factor.
4. The stochastic MAB mechanism design problem admits a very reasonable notion of truthfulness that is
even weaker: truthfulness in expectation, where for each vector of CTRs the expectation is taken over
clicks (and the internal randomness in the mechanism, if the latter is not deterministic).8 Following
our line of investigation, we ask whether restricting a mechanism to be truthful in expectation has
any implications on the structure and regret thereof. Given our negative results on mechanisms that
are truthful and normalized, it is tempting to seek similar results for mechanisms that are truthful in
expectation and normalized in expectation. We show that such approach is not likely to be fruitful.
Surprisingly, we prove that any monotone-in-expectation MAB allocation rule gives rise to an MAB
mechanism that is truthful in expectation and normalized in expectation, with a very minor increase in
regret. The key idea is to view the expected payments as multivariate polynomials over the CTRs, and
argue that any such polynomial can be “implemented” by a suitable payment rule. While this result is
purely theoretical, e.g. because the payments have very high variance, it implies that any impossibility
result for truthful-in-expectation MAB mechanisms must either follow directly from monotonicity-in-
expectation of the allocation rule, or requires bounds on the variability of the payments.
Informational obstacle. Our paper exposes a new kind of obstacle which might stands in the way of
designing truthful mechanisms: insufficient observable information to compute payments; we will term it
“informational obstacle” from here on.
Interestingly, this obstacle appears more general than the current setting. First, it would still feature
prominently in any mechanism design setting which can be modeled as one of the numerous MAB settings
studied in the literature. Second, and perhaps more importantly, we conjecture that it can be extended to a
very general class of mechanisms that interact with the environment. The follow-up work [56, 48] provides
some evidence to this conjecture, see Section 1.3 for more details.
7An oblivious adversary chooses the entire click realization in advance, without observing algorithm’s behavior.
8Normalized-in-expectation and monotone-in-expectation properties are defined similarly.
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1.2 Additional related work
Mechanism Design. The question of how the performance of a truthful mechanism compares to that of the
optimal algorithm for the corresponding non-strategic problem is one of the central themes in Algorithmic
Mechanism Design. Performance gaps have been shown for various scheduling problems [3, 40, 18] and for
online auction for expiring goods [35]. Other papers presented approximation gaps due to computational
constraints, e.g. for combinatorial auctions [34, 18] and combinatorial public projects [43], showing a gap
via a structural result for truthful mechanisms.
The intersection of Machine Learning and Mechanism Design is an active research area which includes
work in various topics such as online mechanisms [35], dynamic auctions [13, 4], dynamic pricing [46],
secretary problems [21], offline learning from self-interested data sources [10, 37] and a number of others.
A more detailed review of this area, or any of the topics listed above, is beyond the scope of this paper.
MAB mechanisms. MAB algorithms were used in the design of Cost-Per-Action sponsored search auc-
tions in Nazerzadeh et al. [39], where the authors construct a mechanism with approximate (asymptotic)
properties of truthfulness and individual rationality. However, even if the gains from lying are small, it may
still be rational for the agents to deviate from being truthful, perhaps significantly. Moreover, as truthful
bidding is not a Nash equilibrium, an agent may speculate that other agents will deviate, which in turn may
increase her own incentives to deviate. All of that may result in unpredictable, and possibly highly subopti-
mal outcomes. On the other hand, approximate truthfulness guarantees suffice whenever it is reasonable to
assume that the agents would not lie unless it leads to significant gains.
In a concurrent and independent work with respect to this paper, Devanur and Kakade [17] considered
the same setting: deterministic truthful MAB mechanisms. They focus on maximizing the revenue of the
mechanism (as opposed to the social welfare). They present an impossibility result for the two-agent case:
a lower bound of Ω(T 2/3) on the loss in revenue with respect to the VCG payments; this bound is extended
to deterministic MAB mechanisms that are truthful with high probability. They also provide a deterministic
truthful mechanism which matches the above lower bound, and is almost identical to our simple two-phase
mechanism described in Section 1.1.9
A closely related line of work on dynamic auctions [13, 4, 44, 25] considers a more general setting in
which private information is revealed to agents over time. The mechanism needs to create the right incentives
for the agents to reveal all the information they receive over time, and to stay in the auction after every round;
these challenges do not exist in our setting, in which all private information is known to the agents upfront.
On the other hand, these papers study fully Bayesian settings in which Bayesian priors on CTRs are known
and VCG-like social welfare-maximizing mechanisms are therefore feasible. In our setting – with no priors
on CTRs – VCG-style mechanisms cannot be applied as such mechanisms require the allocation to exactly
maximize the expected social welfare, which is impossible (and even not well-defined) without a prior.
Moreover, even if applied to MAB mechanisms with Baeysian priors over CTRs, the techniques from this
line of work can only guarantee truthfulness in expectation over the Bayesian prior, which is a much weaker
notion compared to the “prior-independent” notions of truthfulness that are studied in this paper.
Multi-armed bandits (MAB). Absent the strategic constraint, our problem fits into the framework of
MAB algorithms. MAB has a rich literature in Statistics, Operations Research, Computer Science and
Economics; a reader can refer to [14, 12] for background. Most relevant to the present paper is the work on
stochastic MAB [32, 6] and adversarial MAB [7]. Both directions have spawned vast amounts of follow-up
research. Results used in this paper come from [6, 32, 7, 5, 8, 28].
9This mechanism is for a more general setting in which values-per-click change over time and the agents are allowed to submit
a different bid at every round. Instead of assigning all impressions to the same agent in the exploitation phase, their mechanism
runs the same allocation and payment procedure for each exploitation round separately, with the bids submitted in this round.
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Our lower bounds on regret use (a novel application of) the relative entropy technique from [32, 7],
see [29] for an account. This is the technique typically used to prove lower bound on regret for MAB and
related problems. For other application of this technique, see e.g. [16, 26, 30, 11].
The prior work on MAB algorithms considered numerous MAB settings with various assumptions on
payoff evolution over time (e.g., [7, 51, 23]), dependencies between arms (e.g., [20, 42, 30, 52]), side
information available to an algorithm (e.g., [30, 33, 49]), etc. Many of these settings are motivated by
pay-per-click ad auctions. For every such MAB setting one could define the corresponding version of the
MAB mechanism design problem.
1.3 Follow-up work
The conference publication of this paper gave rise to a several follow-up papers [9, 56, 22, 48] which have
addressed some of the questions left open by this paper and posed some new ones. Below we present the
current snapshot of this line of work.
One direction concerns weakly truthful, randomized MAB mechanisms. Informally, the main question
here is whether they are significantly more powerful than their deterministic counterparts. Babaioff, Klein-
berg and Slivkins [9] resolve this question in the affirmative: they prove that there exist weakly truthful
randomized MAB mechanisms whose regret bounds for the stochastic MAB setting are optimal for MAB
algorithms, both in the worst case and for δ-gap instances. A major component of this result, henceforth
called the BKS reduction, reduces designing weakly truthful MAB mechanisms to designing MAB alloca-
tion rules that satisfy the appropriate notion of monotonicity called weak monotonicity: an MAB allocation
is weakly monotone if for each click realization, it is monotone in expectation over its random seed.10 The
BKS reduction subsumes and generalizes our result on truthfulness in expectation (using a very different
technique). Moreover, it is not specific to the stochastic MAB setting: it extends beyond MAB mechanisms
to arbitrary single-parameter domains (see [41] for more background). In particular, the BKS reduction
applies to MAB mechanisms with clicks chosen by an oblivious adversary, and to MAB mechanism design
problems based on most other settings studied in the vast literature on MAB algorithms.
Our truthful-in-expectation construction and the BKS reduction suffer from a very high variance in
payments. Both results include an explicit tradeoff between the variance in payments and the loss in perfor-
mance. Very recently, Wilkens and Sivan [56] have proved that the tradeoff in the BKS reduction is optimal
in a certain worst-case sense: the BKS reduction achieves the optimal worst-case variance in payments for
any given worst-case loss in performance, where the worst case is over all monotone MAB allocation rules.
(More generally, the optimality result in [56] applies to any given single-parameter problem.)
Additional developments in [9] concern MAB allocation rules. First, they prove that an MAB allocation
rule based on UCB1 satisfies monotonicity-in-expectation, and therefore can be transformed (using our result
from Section 7 or the BKS reduction) to a truthful-in-expectation MAB mechanism with essentially the same
regret. Second, they provide a new deterministic MAB allocation rule called NewCB which has optimal
regret and is monotone. In conjunction with the BKS reduction, NewCB yields the weakly truthful MAB
mechanism discussed above.
The analysis in this paper provides a strong intuition that the crucial obstacle for deterministic MAB
mechanisms is not the monotonicity of an allocation rule but instead the “informational obstacle”: insuffi-
cient observable information to compute payments. The analysis of NewCB in [9] makes this point rigorous.
Moreover, [56, 48] describe some additional settings, different from MAB mechanisms, where this “infor-
mational obstacle” arises. Wilkens and Sivan [56] provide two variants of offline pay-per-click ad auctions
with multiple ad slots. Shneider et al. [48] describe a packet scheduling problem in a network router, where
the potentially non-observable information is the packet arrival times (rather than the click events). They
10[9] uses a somewhat different (and perhaps more systematic) terminology regarding the different notions of truthfulness, mono-
tonicity and normalization. We discuss the results from [9] using the terminology of the present paper.
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observe that in the network router setting information about packet arrival times may be missing not only
because it is not observed by the router but also because the router does not have much space to store it.
Finally, a very recent paper by Gatti, Lazaric and Trovo [22] considers multi-slot MAB mechanisms, i.e.
pay-per-click ad auctions with multiple ad slots and unknown CTRs. This setting combines multi-slot pay-
per-click ad auctions [55, 19] on the mechanism design side, and multi-slot MAB [45, 53] on the learning
side. The authors provide truthful multi-slot MAB mechanisms based on the simple MAB mechanism
presented in this paper and (independently) in Devanur and Kakade [17].
Despite all these exciting development, MAB mechanisms are not well-understood; see Section 8 for
the current snapshot of open questions.
1.4 Map of the paper
Section 2 is preliminaries. Truthfulness characterization is developed and proved in Section 3 and Section A.
The lower bounds on regret are presented in Section 4. The simple mechanism that matches these lower
bounds is in Section 5. Weakly truthful randomized allocations for adversarial clicks are derived in Section 6.
Truthfulness in expectation is discussed in Section 7. Open questions are in Section 8.
2 Definitions and preliminaries
In the MAB mechanism design problem, there is a set K of k agents numbered from 1 to k. Each agent
i has a value vi > 0 for every click she gets; this value is known only to agent i. Initially, each agent i
submits a bid bi > 0, possibly different from vi. 11 12 The “game” lasts for T rounds, where T is the given
time horizon. A click realization represents the click information for all agents and all rounds. Formally,
it is a tuple ρ = (ρ1 , . . . , ρk) such that for every agent i and round t, the bit ρi(t) ∈ {0, 1} indicates
whether i gets a click if selected at round t. An instance of the MAB mechanism design problem consists
of the number of agents k, time horizon T , a vector of private values v = (v1, . . . , vk), a vector of bids (bid
profile) b = (b1, . . . , bk), and click realization ρ.
A mechanism is a pair (A,P), where A is allocation rule and P is the payment rule. An allocation rule
is represented by a function A that maps bid profile b, click realization ρ and a round t to the agent i that
is chosen (receives an impression) in this round: A(b; ρ; t) = i. We also denote Ai(b; ρ; t) = 1{A(b;ρ;t)=i}.
The allocation is online in the sense that at each round it can only depend on clicks observed prior to that
round. Moreover, it does not know the click realization in advance; in every round it only observes the click
realization for the agent that is shown in that round. A payment rule is a tuple P = (P1 , . . . ,Pk), where
Pi(b; ρ) ∈ R denotes the payment charged to agent i when the bids are b and the click realization is ρ. 13
Again, the payment can only depend on observed clicks.
A mechanism is called normalized if for any agent i, bids b−i of the other agents, and click realization
ρ it holds that Pi(bi, b−i; ρ)→ 0 as bi → 0. For any single-parameter, truthful mechanism, this limit exists
and is independent of bi [38, 3]; further, this limit is always 0, for a given agent i, if and only if the payment
per click is between 0 and bi.
11One can also consider a more realistic and general model in which the value-per-click of an agent changes over time and the
agents are allowed to change their bid at every round. The case that the value-per-click of each agent does not change over time
is a special case. In that case truthfulness implies that each agent basically submits one bid as in our model (the same bid at every
round), thus our main results (necessary conditions for truthfulness and regret lower bounds) also hold for the more general model.
12Since private values vi are strictly positive, there is no need to allow zero bids. Also, this avoids some technical complications
in the proofs. Accordingly, we define “normalized mechanisms” in terms of the payment as bi → 0.
13We allow the mechanism to determine the payments at the end of the T rounds, and not after every round. This makes that task
of designing a truthful mechanism easier and thus strengthen our necessary condition for truthfulness (the condition used to derive
the lower bounds on regret.)
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For given click realization ρ and bid profile b, the number of clicks received by agent i is denoted
Ci(b; ρ). Call C = (C1 , . . . , Ck) the click-allocation for A. The utility that agent i with value vi gets from
the mechanism (A,P) when the bids are b and the click realization is ρ is Ui(vi; b; ρ) = vi ·Ci(b; ρ)−Pi(b; ρ)
(quasi-linear utility). The mechanism is truthful if for any agent i, value vi, bid profile b and click realization
ρ it is the case that Ui(vi; vi, b−i; ρ) ≥ Ui(vi; bi, b−i; ρ).
In the stochastic MAB mechanism design problem, an adversary specifies a vector µ = (µ1 , . . . , µk) of
CTRs (concealed from A), then for each agent i and round t, click realization ρi(t) is chosen independently
with mean µi. Thus, an instance of the problem includes µ rather than a fixed click realization. For a given
problem instance I , let i∗ ∈ argmaxi µi vi, then regret on this instance is defined as
RI(T ) = T vi∗µi∗ − E
[∑T
t=1
∑k
i=1 µi vi Ai(b; ρ; t)
]
. (2.1)
For a given parameter vmax, the worst-case regret14 R(T ; vmax) denotes the supremum of RI(T ) over all
problem instances I in which all private values are at most vmax. Similarly, we define Rδ(T ; vmax), the
worst-case δ-regret, by taking the supremum only on instances with δ-gap.
Most of our results are stated for non-degenerate allocation rules, defined as follows. An interval is
called non-degenerate if it has positive length. Fix bid profile b, click realization ρ, and rounds t and t′ with
t ≤ t′. Let i = A(b; ρ; t) and ρ′ be the allocation obtained from ρ by flipping the bit ρi(t). An allocation
rule A is non-degenerate w.r.t. (b, ρ, t, t′) if there exists a non-degenerate interval I containing bi such that
Ai(x, b−i;ϕ; s) = Ai(b;ϕ; s) for each ϕ ∈ {ρ, ρ′}, each s ∈ {t, t′}, and all x ∈ I.
An allocation rule is non-degenerate if it is non-degenerate w.r.t. each tuple (b, ρ, t, t′).
3 Truthfulness characterization
Before presenting our characterization we begin by describing some related background. The click alloca-
tion C is non-decreasing if for each agent i, increasing her bid (and keeping everything else fixed) does not
decrease Ci. Prior work has established a characterization of truthful mechanisms for single-parameter do-
mains (domains in which the private information of each agent is one-dimensional), relating click allocation
monotonicity and truthfulness (see below). For our problem, this result is a characterization of MAB algo-
rithms that are truthful for a given click realization ρ, assuming that the entire click realization ρ can be used
to compute payments (when computing payments one can use click information for every round and every
agent, even if the agent was not shown at that round.) One of our main contributions is a characterization
of MAB allocation rules that can be truthfully implemented when payment computation is restricted to only
use clicks information of the actual impressions assigned by the allocation rule.
3.1 Monotonicity
An MAB allocation rule A is truthful with unrestricted payment computation if it is truthful with a payment
rule that can use the entire click realization ρ in it computation. We next present the prior result character-
izing truthful mechanisms with unrestricted payment computation.
Theorem 3.1 (Myerson [38], Archer and Tardos [3]). Let (A,P) be a normalized mechanism for the MAB
mechanism design problem. It is truthful with unrestricted payment computation if and only if for any given
click realization ρ the corresponding click-allocation C is non-decreasing and the payment rule is given by
Pi(bi, b−i; ρ) = bi · Ci(bi, b−i; ρ)−
∫ bi
0 Ci(x, b−i; ρ) dx. (3.1)
14By abuse of notation, when clear from the context, the “worst-case regret” is sometimes simply called “regret”.
11
We can now move to characterize truthful MAB mechanisms when the payment computation is re-
stricted. The following notation will be useful: for a given click realization ρ, let ρ ⊕ 1(i, t), be the click
realization that coincides with ρ everywhere, except that the bit ρi(t) is flipped.
The first notable property of truthful mechanisms is a stronger version of monotonicity. Recall (see
Definition 1.1) that an allocation rule A is pointwise monotone if for each click realization ρ, bid profile b,
round t and agent i, if Ai(bi, b−i; ρ; t) = 1 then Ai(b+i , b−i; ρ; t) = 1 for any b+i > bi. In words, increasing
a bid cannot cause a loss of an impression.
Lemma 3.2. Consider the MAB mechanism design problem. Let (A,P) be a normalized truthful mechanism
such that A is a non-degenerate deterministic allocation rule. Then A is pointwise-monotone.
Proof. For a contradiction, assume not. Then there is a click realization ρ, a bid profile b, a round t and
agent i such that agent i loses an impression in round t by increasing her bid from bi to some larger value
b+i . In other words, we have Ai(b+i , b−i; ρ; t) < Ai(bi, b−i; ρ; t). Without loss of generality, let us assume
that there are no clicks after round t, that is ρj(t′) = 0 for any agent j and any round t′ > t (since changes
in ρ after round t does not affect anything before round t).
Let ρ′ = ρ ⊕ 1(i, t). The allocation in round t cannot depend on this bit, so it must be the same
for both click realizations. Now, for each click realization ϕ ∈ {ρ, ρ′} the mechanism must be able to
compute the price for agent i when bids are (b+i , b−i). That involves computing the integral Ii(ϕ) =∫
x≤b+i
Ci(x, b−i;ϕ) dx from (3.1). We claim that Ii(ρ) 6= Ii(ρ′). However, the mechanism cannot dis-
tinguish between ρ and ρ′ since they only differ in bit (i, t) and agent i does not get an impression in round
t. This is a contradiction.
It remains to prove the claim. Without loss of generality, assume that ρi(t) = 0 (otherwise interchange
the role of ρ and ρ′). We first note that Ci(x, b−i; ρ) ≤ Ci(x, b−i; ρ′) for every x. This is because everything
is same in ρ and ρ′ until round t (so the impressions are same too), there are no clicks after round t, and in
round t the behavior ofA on the two click realizations can be different only if that agent i gets an impression,
in which case she is clicked under ρ′ and not clicked under ρ.
Since A is non-degenerate, there exists a non-degenerate interval I containing bi such that changing bid
of agent i to any value in this interval does not change the allocation at round t (both for ρ and for ρ′). For
any x ∈ I we have Ci(x, b−i; ρ) < Ci(x, b−i; ρ′), where the difference is due to the click in round t. It
follows that Ii(ρ) < Ii(ρ′). Claim proved. Hence, the mechanism cannot be implemented truthfully.
3.2 Structural definitions
Let us restate the structural definitions from the Introduction in a more detailed fashion.
Definition 3.3. Fix click realization ρ, bid vector b, and round t.
(a) Round t is called (b; ρ)-secured from agent i if A(b+i , b−i; ρ; t) = A(bi, b−i; ρ; t) for any b+i > bi.
(b) Round t is called bid-independent w.r.t. ρ if the allocation A(b; ρ; t) is a constant function of b.
(c) Round t is called (b; ρ)-influential if for some round t′ > t it holds that A(b; ρ; t′) 6= A(b; ρ′; t′) for
click realization ρ′ = ρ⊕ 1(j, t) such that j = A(b; ρ; t). 15 In words: changing the relevant part of
the click realization at round t affects the allocation in some future round t′.
(d) In part (c), round t′ is called the influenced round and j is called the influencing agent of round t. The
agent i is called an influenced agent of round t if i ∈ {A(b; ρ; t′), A(b; ρ′; t′)}.
15Note that click realizations ρ and ρ′ are interchangeable.
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(e) Round t is called influential w.r.t. click realization ρ if and only if it is (b, ρ)-influential for some b.
Definition 3.4. Let A be a deterministic MAB allocation rule.
• A is called exploration-separated if for every click realization ρ and round t that is influential for ρ,
it holds that A(b; ρ; t) = A(b′; ρ; t) for any two bid vectors b, b′ (in words: allocation at round t does
not depend on the bids).
• A is called weakly separated if for every click realization ρ and bid vector b, it holds that if round t is
(b; ρ)-influential with influenced agent i then it is (b; ρ)-secured from i.
Observation 3.5. Any deterministic, exploration-separated MAB allocation rule is weakly separated.
Proof. It follows from the definitions. Fix click realization ρ and bid vector b, let t be a (b; ρ)-influential
round with influenced agent i. We need to show that t is (b; ρ)-secured from i. Round t is (b; ρ)-influential,
thus influential w.r.t. ρ, thus (since the allocation is exploration-separated) it is bid-independent w.r.t. ρ, thus
agent i cannot change allocation in round t by increasing her bid.
Observation 3.6. Let A be a scale-free, weakly separated MAB allocation rule for two agents. Then A is
exploration-separated.
The proof of this observation is fairly straightforward, but it requires to carefully unwind the definitions.
To provide some intuition with these definitions, we write it out in detail.
Proof of Observation 3.6. Fix a click realization ρ and round t that is influential for ρ. Let b, b′ be two bid
vectors. We need to conclude that A(b; ρ; t) = A(b′; ρ; t).
By definition of “influential round”, there exists some bid vector b∗ such that t is (b∗, ρ)-influential with
influenced agent i. Since there are only two agents, the other agent is influenced, too. By definition of
“weakly separated”, round t is (b∗, ρ)-secured from both agents. By definition of “secured”, we have:
A(b∗; ρ; t) = A(b+1 , b∗2; ρ; t) for any b+1 > b∗1 (3.2)
= A(b∗1, b+2 ; ρ; t) for any b+2 > b∗2. (3.3)
Let us prove that A(b; ρ; t) = A(b∗; ρ; t). We consider two cases.
• Suppose b1/b2 ≥ b∗1/b∗2. Then by definition of “scale-free”, letting λ = b∗2/b2 we have A(b; ρ; t) =
A(λb1, b∗2; ρ; t). Since λb1 > b∗1, then we are done by taking b+1 = λb1 and using (3.2).
• Suppose b1/b2 < b∗1/b∗2. Then by definition of “scale-free”, letting λ = b∗1/b1 we have A(b; ρ; t) =
A(b∗1, λb2; ρ; t). Since λb2 > b∗2, then we are done by taking b+2 = λb2 and using (3.3).
Claim proved. Similarly, A(b′; ρ; t) = A(b∗; ρ; t).
3.3 The two agents case (Theorem 1.3)
The two-agent structural characterization in Theorem 1.3 follows from the general characterization in The-
orem 1.5. More precisely, the “if” direction of Theorem 1.3 follows from the “if” direction of Theorem 1.5
and Observation 3.5; the “only if” direction of Theorem 1.3 follows from the “only if” direction of Theo-
rem 1.5 and Observation 3.6.
The main structural implication in both theorems is that truthfulness implies the corresponding structural
condition (either that the allocation rule is exploration separated or that it is weakly separated.) To illustrate
the ideas behind this implication, we prove the two-agent case directly.
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Proposition 3.7. Consider the MAB mechanism design problem with two agents. LetA be a non-degenerate
scale-free deterministic allocation rule. If (A,P) is a normalized truthful mechanism for some P, then it is
exploration separated.
Proof. Assume A is not exploration-separated. Then there is a counterexample (ρ, t): a click realization ρ
and a round t such that round t is influential and allocation in round t depends on bids. We want to prove
that this leads to a contradiction.
Let us pick a counterexample (ρ, t) with some useful properties. Since round t is influential, there exists
a click realization ρ and bid profile b such that the allocation at some round t′ > t (the influenced round)
is different under click realization ρ and another click realization ρ′ = ρ ⊕ 1(j, t), where j = A(b; ρ; t) is
the agent chosen at round t under ρ. Without loss of generality, let us pick a counterexample with minimum
value of t′ over all choices of (b, ρ, t). For ease of exposition, from this point on let us assume that j = 2.
For the counterexample we can also assume that ρ1(t′) = 1, and that there are no clicks after round t′, that
is ρl(t′′) = ρ′l(t′′) = 0 for all t′′ > t′ and for all l ∈ {1, 2}.
We know that the allocation in round t depends on bids. This means that agent 1 gets an impression in
round t for some bid profile bˆ = (bˆ1, bˆ2) under click realization ρ, that is A(bˆ; ρ; t) = 1. As the mechanism
is scale-free this means that, denoting b+1 = bˆ1 b2/bˆ2 we have A(b+1 , b2; ρ; t) = 1. Since A(b1, b2; ρ; t) = 2
and A(b+1 , b2; ρ; t) = 1, pointwise monotonicity (Lemma 3.2) implies that b+1 > b1. We conclude that there
exists a bid b+1 > b1 for agent 1 such that A(b+1 , b2; ρ; t) = 1.
Now, the mechanism needs to compute prices for agent 1 for bids (b+1 , b2) under click realizations ρ
and ρ′, that is P1(b+1 , b2; ρ) and P1(b+i , b2; ρ′). Therefore, the mechanism needs to compute the integral
I1(ϕ) =
∫
x≤b+
1
C1(x, b2;ϕ) dx for both click realizations ϕ ∈ {ρ, ρ′}.
First of all, for all x ≤ b+1 and for all t′′ < t′, A(x, b2; ρ; t′′) = A(x, b2; ρ′; t′′), since otherwise the
minimality of t′ will be violated. The only difference in the allocation can occur in round t′.
Let us assume A1(b1, b2; ρ; t′) < A1(b1, b2; ρ′, t′) (otherwise, we can swap ρ and ρ′). We make the
claim that for all bids x ≤ b+1 of agent 1, the influence of round t on round t′ is in the same “direction”:
A1(x, b2; ρ; t′) ≤ A1(x, b2; ρ′; t′) for all x ≤ b+1 . (3.4)
Suppose (3.4) does not hold. Then there is an x < b+1 such that 1 = A1(x, b2; ρ; t′) > A1(x, b2; ρ′; t′) = 0.
(Note that we have used the fact that the mechanism is deterministic.) If x < b1 then pointwise monotonicity
is violated under click realization ρ, since A1(x, b2; ρ; t′) > A1(b1, b2; ρ; t′); otherwise it is violated under
click realization ρ′, giving a contradiction in both cases. The claim (3.4) follows.
Since A is non-degenerate, there exists a non-degenerate interval I containing bi such that if agent 1
bids any value x ∈ I then A1(x, b2; ρ; t′) < A1(x, b2; ρ′; t′). Now by (3.4) it follows that I1(ρ) < I2(ρ′).
However, the mechanism cannot distinguish between ρ and ρ′ when the bid of agent 1 is b+1 , since the
differing bit ρ2(t) is not observed. Therefore the mechanism cannot compute prices, contradiction.
3.4 The general case (Theorem 1.5)
Let us prove the general characterization (Theorem 1.5). We restate it here for convenience.
Theorem (Theorem 1.5, restated). Consider the MAB mechanism design problem. LetA be a non-degenerate
deterministic allocation rule. Then a mechanism (A,P) is normalized and truthful for some payment rule
P if and only if A is pointwise monotone and weakly separated.
Proof of Theorem 1.5: the “only if” direction. Suppose (A,P) be a normalized truthful mechanism, for
some payment rule P. Then A is pointwise-monotone by Lemma 3.2. The fact that A is weakly sepa-
rated is proved similarly to Proposition 3.7, albeit with a few extra details.
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Assume A is not weakly separated. Then there is a counterexample (ρ, b, t, t′, i): a click realization
ρ, bid vector b, rounds t, t′ and agent i such that round t is (b; ρ)-influential with influenced agent i and
influenced round t′ and it does not holds that round t is (b; ρ)-secured from i. We prove that this leads to a
contradiction..
Let us pick a counterexample (ρ, b, t, t′, i) with a minimum value of t′ over all choices of (ρ, b, t, i).
Without loss of generality, let us assume that ρi(t′) = 1 and ρj(t′′) = 0 for all t′′ > t′ and for all agents j.
Let j = A(b; ρ; t). As it does not holds that round t is (b; ρ)-secured from i, this means that j 6= i, and
there exists a bid b+i > bi such that A(b+i , b−i; ρ; t) 6= j.
Let ρ′ = ρ⊕1(j, t). The mechanism needs to compute prices for agent i when her bid is b+i under click
realizations ρ and ρ′, that is to compute Pi(b+i , b−i; ρ) and Pi(b+i , b−i; ρ′). Therefore, the mechanism needs
to compute the integral Ii(ϕ) =
∫
x≤b+
1
Ci(x, b−i;ϕ) dx for both click realizations ϕ ∈ {ρ, ρ′}.
First of all, for all x ≤ b+i and for all t′′ < t′, Ai(x, b−i; ρ; t′′) = Ai(x, b−i; ρ′; t′′). If not,then the
minimality of t′ will be violated. This is because, if there were such an x and t′′ < t′ withAi(x, b−i; ρ; t′′) 6=
Ai(x, b−i; ρ′; t′′), then round t will still be (b, ρ)-influential with influenced agent i, and influenced round
t′′ < t′, violating the minimality of t′′. Therefore, when we decrease the bid of agent i, the only difference
in the allocation can occur at time round t′.
As i is the influenced agent at round t′ it must hold that Ai(bi, b−i; ρ; t′) 6= Ai(bi, b−i; ρ′, t′). Let us
assume 0 = Ai(bi, b−i; ρ; t′) < Ai(bi, b−i; ρ′, t′) = 1 (otherwise, we can swap ρ and ρ′). Note that we have
made use of the fact that the mechanism is deterministic. Let us make the the claim that for all bids x ≤ b+i
the influence of round t on round t′ is in the same “direction.”
Ai(x, b−i; ρ; t′) ≤ Ai(x, b−i; ρ′; t′) for all x ≤ b+i . (3.5)
Suppose (3.5) does not hold. Then there is an x ≤ b+i such that 1 = Ai(x, b−i; ρ; t′) > Ai(x, b−i; ρ′; t′) = 0.
(Note that we have used the fact that the mechanism is deterministic.) If x > bi, then pointwise monotonicity
is violated in ρ′, since 0 = Ai(x, b−i; ρ′; t′) < Ai(bi, b−i; ρ′; t′) = 1. If x < bi on the other hand, then
the pointwise-monotonicity is violated in ρ, since 1 = Ai(x, b−i; ρ; t′) > Ai(bi, b−i; ρ; t′) = 0, giving a
contradiction in both cases. The claim (3.5) follows.
By the non-degeneracy of A, there exists a non-degenerate interval I containing bi such that
Ai(x, b−i; ρ; t′) < Ai(x, b−i; ρ′; t′) for all x ∈ I. (3.6)
By (3.5) and (3.6) it follows that Ii(ρ) < Ii(ρ′). However, the mechanism cannot distinguish between ρ
and ρ′ when agent i’s bid is b+i , since the differing bit ρj(t) is not seen. Contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 1.5: the “if” direction. LetA be a deterministic allocation rule which is pointwise mono-
tone and weakly separated. We need to provide a payment rule P such that the resulting mechanism (A,P)
is truthful and normalized. Since A is pointwise monotone, it immediately follows that it is monotone (i.e.,
as an agent increases her bid, the number of clicks that she gets cannot decrease). Therefore it follows from
Theorem 3.1 that mechanism (A,P) is truthful and normalized if and only if P is given by (3.1). We need
to show that P can be computed using only the knowledge of the clicks (bits from the click realization) that
were revealed during the execution of A.
Assume we want to compute the payment for agent i in bid profile (bi, b−i) and click realization ρ. We
will prove that we can compute Ci(x) := Ci(x, b−i; ρ) for all x ≤ bi. To compute Ci(x), we show that it
is possible to simulate the execution of the mechanism with bidi = x. In some rounds, the agent i loses
an impression, and in others it retains the impression (pointwise monotonicity ensures that agent i cannot
gain an impression when decreasing her bid). In rounds that it loses an impression, the mechanism does
not observe the bits of ρ in those rounds, so we prove that those bits are irrelevant while computing Ci(x).
In other words, while running with bidi = x, if mechanism needs to observe the bit that was not revealed
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when running with bidi = bi, we arbitrarily put that bit equal to 1 and simulate the execution of A. We
want to prove that this computes Ci(x) correctly.
Let t1 < t2 < · · · < tn be the rounds in which agent i did not get an impression while bidding x, but did
get an impression while bidding bi. Let ρ0 := ρ, and let us define click realization ρl inductively for every
l ∈ [n] by setting ρl := ρl−1 ⊕ 1(jl, tl), where jl = A(x, b−i; ρl−1; tl) is the agent that got the impression
at round tl with click realization ρl−1 and bids (x, b−i).
First, we claim that jl 6= i for any l. Indeed, suppose not, and pick the smallest l such that jl+1 = i.
Then tl is a (x, b−i; ρl)-influential round, with influenced agent jl+1 = i. Thus tl is (x, b−i; ρl)-secured
from i. Since A(x, b−i; ρl; tl) = A(x, b−i; ρl−1; tl) = jl 6= i by minimality of l, agent i does not get an
impression in round tl if she raises her bid to bi. That is, A(b; ρl; tl) 6= i. However, the changes in click
realizations ρ0 , . . . , ρl−1 only concern the rounds in which agent i is chosen, so they are not seen by the
allocation if the bid profile is b (to prove this formally, use induction). Thus, A(b; ρl; tl) = A(b; ρ; tl) = i,
contradiction. Claim proved. It follows that A(b; ρ; tl) = i for each l. (This is because by induction, the
change from ρl−1 to ρl is not seen by the allocation if the bid profile is b.)
We claim that Ai(x, b−i; ρ; t′) = Ai(x, b−i; ρn; t′) for every round t′, which will prove the theorem. If
not, then there exists l such that Ai(x, b−i; ρl; t′) 6= Ai(x, b−i; ρl−1; t′) for some t′ (and of course t′ > tl).
Round tl is thus (x, b−i; ρl)-influential with influenced round t′ and influenced agent i. Moreover, the
influencing agent of that round is jl, and we already proved that jl 6= i. Since round tl is (x, b−i; ρl)-secured
from agent i due to the “weakly separated” condition, it follows that agent i does not get an impression in
round tl if she raises her bid to bi. That is, A(b; ρl; tl) 6= i, contradiction.
Let us argue that the non-degeneracy assumption in Theorem 1.5 is indeed necessary.
Claim 3.8. There exists a deterministic mechanism (A,P) for two agents that is truthful and normalized,
such that the allocation rule A is pointwise monotone, scale-free and yet not weakly separated.
Proof. There are only two rounds. Agent 1 allocated at round 1 if and only if b1 ≥ b2. Agent 1 allocated at
round 2 if b1 > b2 or if b1 = b2 and ρ1(1) = 1; otherwise agent 2 is shown. This completes the description
of the allocation rule. To obtain a payment rule P which makes the mechanism normalized and truthful,
consider an alternate allocation ruleA′ which in each round selects agent 1 if and only if b1 ≥ b2. (Note that
A′ = A except when b1 = b2.) Use Theorem 1.5 forA′ to obtain a normalized truthful mechanism (A′,P ′),
and set P = P ′. The payment rule P is well-defined since the observed clicks for P and P ′ coincide unless
b1 = b2, in which case both payment rules charge 0 to both agents. The resulting mechanism (A,P) is
normalized and truthful because the integral in (3.1) remains the same even if we change the value at a
single point. It is easy to see that the allocation rule A has all the claimed properties; it fails to be non-
degenerate because round t is influential only when b1 = b2.
3.5 Scalefree and IIA allocation rules
We show that under the right assumptions, an MAB allocation rule is exploration-separated if and only if it
is weakly separated.
Lemma 3.9. Consider the MAB mechanism design problem. Let A be a non-degenerate deterministic
allocation rule which is scalefree, pointwise monotone, and satisfies IIA. Then it is exploration-separated if
and only if it is weakly separated.
The proof of Lemma 3.9 is very technical. We precede it with a proof sketch. To preserve the flow, we
place the full proof in Appendix A.
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Figure 1: This figure explains all the steps in the proof of Lemma 3.9. The rows correspond to agents (whose identity
is shown on the right side), and columns correspond to time rounds. The asterisks show the impressions. The arrows
show how the impressions get transferred, and labels on the arrows show what causes the transfer. In labels, “in ρ,
bi ↑” denotes that a particular transfer of impression is caused in click realization ρ when bid bi in increased.
Proof Sketch. We sketch the proof of Lemma 3.9 at a very high level. The “only if” direction was observed
in Observation 3.5; we focus on the “if” direction. Let A be a weakly-separated mechanism. We prove by
a contradiction that it is exploration-separated. If not, then there is a click realization ρ and a round t such
that t is influencial w.r.t. ρ as well as not bid-dependent w.r.t. ρ. Let round t be influencial with bid vector b,
influencing agent l, and influenced agents j and j′ 6= j in influenced round t′ (see 1 in Figure 1; all boxed
numbers in this sketch will refer to this figure).
From the assumption, t is not bid-dependent w.r.t. ρ, which means that there exists a bid profile b′ such
that i′ 6= l is selected in round t with bids b′. Using scalefreeness, IIA, and pointwise-monotonicity, we
can prove that there exists a sufficiently large bid b+i′ of agent i′ such that she gets an impression in round t
with bids (b+i′ , b−i′) (see 2 ). Using the properties of the mechanism, it can further be proved that there is an
agent i such that she gets the impression in round t when either i increases her bid, or l decreases her bid
(see 3 ). When i increases her bid to b+i , she also gets an impression in round t′, since impressions cannot
differ in round t′ in the case when l is not selected in round t and they must get transferred from j and j′ to
somebody in round t′, and IIA implies that this somebody should be i.
Recall that two different agents j and j′ get the impression in round t′ under ρ and ρ′ respectively (see
4 ). We prove that either agent j′ or agent j must be equal to l (this is done by looking at how the allocation
in round t′ changes when l decreases her bid). Let us break the symmetry and assume j′ = l (see box 5 ).
It is also easy to see that when i increases her bid, impression in round t′ get transferred to her in ρ (at
some minimum value b+ρi , see 6 ), and impression in round t′ gets transferred to her also in ρ′ (as some
possibly different minimum value b+ρ
′
i , see 7 ). Using the assumptions of weakly-separatedness, we prove
that b+ρi = b
+ρ′
i (see 8 ). This can be proved by observing that b+i ≥ max{b+ρi , b+ρ
′
i }, and then using
weakly-separatedness of A. Since these two bids were at a “threshold value” (these were the minimum
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values of bids to have transferred the impression in ρ and ρ′ from j and l respectively), we are able to prove
that the ratio of bj/bl must be some fixed number dependent on ρ, ρ′, and t′. In particular, it follows that bl
belongs to a finite set S(b−l) which depends only on b−l. However, by non-degeneracy of A there must be
infinitely many such bl’s, which leads to a contradiction.
4 Lower bounds on regret
In this section we use structural results from the previous section to derive lower bounds on regret.
Theorem 4.1. Consider the stochastic MAB mechanism design problem with k agents. Let A be an
exploration-separated deterministic allocation rule. Then its regret is R(T ; vmax) = Ω(vmax k1/3 T 2/3).
Let ~µ0 = (12 , . . . ,
1
2) ∈ [0, 1]k be the vector of CTRs in which for each agent the CTR is 12 . For each
agent i, let ~µi = (µi1, . . . , µik) ∈ [0, 1]k be the vector of CTRs in which agent i has CTR µii = 12 + ǫ,
ǫ = k1/3 T−1/3, and every other agent j 6= i has CTR µij = 12 . As a notational convention, denote by Pi[·]
and Ei[·] respectively the probability and expectation induced by the algorithm when clicks are given by ~µi.
Let Ii be the problem instance in which CTRs are given by ~µi and all bids are vmax. For each agent i, let Ji
be the problem instance in which CTRs are given by ~µ0, the bid of agent i is vmax, and the bids of all other
agents are vmax/2. We will show that for any exploration-separated deterministic allocation rule A, one of
these 2k instances causes high regret.
Let Ni be the number of bid-independent rounds in which agent i is selected. Note that Ni does not
depend on the bids. It is a random variable in the probability space induced by the clicks; its distribution
is completely specified by the CTRs. We show that (in a certain sense) the allocation cannot distinguish
between ~µ0 and ~µi if Ni is too small. Specifically, let At be the allocation in round t. Once the bids
are fixed, this is a random variable in the probability space induced by the clicks. For a given set S of
agents, we consider the event {At ∈ S} for some fixed round t, and upper-bound the difference between the
probability of this event under ~µ0 and ~µi in terms of Ei[Ni], in the following crucial claim, which is proved
in Section 4.1 via relative entropy techniques.
Claim 4.2. For any fixed vector of bids, each round t, each agent i and each set of agents S, we have
|P0[At ∈ S]− Pi[At ∈ S] | ≤ O(ǫ2 E0[Ni]). (4.1)
Proof of Theorem 4.1: Fix a positive constant β to be specified later. Consider the case k = 2 first. If
E0[Ni] > β T
2/3 for some agent i, then on the problem instance Ji, regret is Ω(T 2/3). So without loss of
generality let us assume E0[Ni] ≤ β T 2/3 for each agent i. Then, plugging in the values for ǫ and E0[Ni],
the right-hand side of (4.1) is at most O(β). Take β so that the right-hand side of (4.1) is at most 14 . For
each round t there is an agent i such that P0[At 6= i] ≥ 12 . Then Pi[At 6= i] ≥ 14 by Claim 4.2, and therefore
in this round algorithm A incurs regret Ω(ǫ vmax) under problem instance Ii. By Pigeonhole Principle there
exists an i such that this happens for at least half of the rounds t, which gives the desired lower-bound.
Case k ≥ 3 requires a different (and somewhat more complicated) argument. Let R = β k1/3 T 2/3 and
N be the number of bid-independent rounds. Assume E0[N ] > R. Then E0[Ni] ≤ 1k E0[N ] for some agent
i. For the problem instance Ji there are, in expectation, E[N − Ni] = Ω(R) bid-independent rounds in
which agent i is not selected; each of which contributes Ω(vmax) to regret, so the total regret is Ω(vmaxR).
From now on assume that E0[N ] ≤ R. Note that by Pigeonhole Principle, there are more than k2 agents
i such that E0[Ni] ≤ 2R/k. Furthermore, let us say that an agent i is good if P0[At = i] ≤ 45 for more than
T/6 different rounds t. We claim that there are more than k2 good agents. Suppose not. If agent i is not good
then P0[At = i] > 45 for at least 56T different rounds t, so if there are at least k/2 such agents then
T =
∑T
t=1
∑k
i=1P0[At = i] > k2 × (56T )× 45 ≥ kT/3 ≥ T,
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contradiction. Claim proved. It follows that there exists a good agent i such that E0[Ni] ≤ 2R/k. Therefore
the right-hand side of (4.1) is at most O(β). Pick β so that the right-hand side of (4.1) is at most 110 . Then
by Claim 4.2 for at least T/6 different rounds t we have Pi[At = i] ≤ 910 . In each such round, if agent i is
not selected then algorithm A incurs regret Ω(ǫ vmax) on problem instance Ii. Therefore, the (total) regret
of A on problem instance Ii is Ω(ǫ vmax T ) = Ω(vmax k1/3 T 2/3).
Theorem 4.3. In the setting of Theorem 4.1, fix k and vmax and assume that R(T ; vmax) = O(vmax T γ)
for some γ < 1. Then for every fixed δ ≤ 14 and λ < 2(1 − γ) we have Rδ(T ; vmax) = Ω(δ vmax T λ).
Proof. Fix λ ∈ (0, 2(1 − γ)). Redefine ~µi’s with respect to a different ǫ, namely ǫ = T−λ/2. Define the
problem instances Ii in the same way as before: all bids are vmax, the CTRs are given by ~µi.
Let us focus on agents 1 and 2. We claim that E1[N1] + E2[N2] ≥ β T λ, where β > 0 is a constant to
be defined later. Suppose not. Fix all bids to be vmax. For each round t, consider event St = {At = 1}.
Then by Claim 4.2 we have∣∣P1[St]− P2[St]∣∣ ≤ ∣∣P0[St]− P1[St]∣∣+ ∣∣P0[St]− P2[St]∣∣ ≤ O (ǫ2) (E1[N1] + E2[N2]) ≤ 14
for a sufficiently small β. Now, P1[St] ≥ 12 for at least T/2 rounds t. This is because otherwise on problem
instance Ii regret would be R(T ) ≥ Ω(ǫ Tvmax) = Ω(vmax T 1−λ/2), which contradicts the assumption
R(T ) = O(vmax T
γ). Therefore P2[St] ≥ 14 for at least T/2 rounds t, hence on problem instance I2 regret
is at least Ω(ǫ Tvmax), contradiction. Claim proved.
Now without loss of generality let us assume that E1[N1] ≥ β2 T λ. Consider the problem instance in
which CTRs given by ~µ1, bid of agent 2 is vmax, and all other bids are vmax(1− 2δ)/(1 + 2ǫ). It is easy to
see that this problem instance has δ-gap. Each time agent 1 is selected, algorithm incurs regret Ω(δvmax).
Thus the total regret is at least Ω(δN1 vmax) = Ω(δ vmax T λ).
4.1 Relative entropy technique: proof of Claim 4.2
We extend the relative entropy technique from [7]. All relevant facts about relative entropy are summarized
in the theorem below. We will need the following definition: given a random variable X on a probability
space (Ω,F ,P), let PX be the distribution of X, i.e. a measure on R defined by PX(x) = P[X = x].
Theorem 4.4 (Some standard facts about relative entropy, e.g. [15, 27, 29]).
Let p and q be two probability measures on a finite set U , and let Y and Z be functions on U . There exists
a function F (p; q|Y ) : U → R with the following properties:
(i) Ep F (p; q|Y ) = Ep F (p; q|(Y,Z)) + Ep F (pZ ; qZ |Y ) (chain rule),
(ii) ∣∣p(U ′)− q(U ′)∣∣ ≤√12D(p‖q) for any event U ′ ⊂ U , where D(p‖q) = Ep F (p; q|1)
(iii) for each x ∈ U , if conditional on the event {Z = Z(x)} p coincides with q, then F (p; q|Z)(x) = 0.
(iv) for each x ∈ U , if conditional on the event {Z = Z(x)} p and q are fair and (12 + ǫ)-biased coins,
respectively, then it is the case that F (p; q|Z)(x) ≤ 4ǫ2.
Remark. This theorem summarizes several well-known facts about relative entropy, albeit in a somewhat
non-standard notation. For the proofs, see [15, 27, 29]. In the proofs, one defines F = F (p; q|Y ) as a
function F : U → R which is specified by F (x) = ∑x′∈U p(x′|Ux) lg p(x′|Ux)q(x′|Ux) , where Ux is the event
{Y = Y (x)}.16 Note that the quantity Ep F (p; q|1) is precisely the relative entropy (a.k.a. KL-divergence),
commonly denoted D(p‖q), and Ep F (p; q|Y ) is the corresponding conditional relative entropy.
16We use the convention that p(x) log(p(x)/q(x)) is 0 when p(x) = 0, and +∞ when p(x) > 0 and q(x) = 0.
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In what follows we use Theorem 4.4 to prove Claim 4.2. For simplicity we will prove (4.1) for i = 1.
The history up to round t is Ht = (h1, h2 , . . . , ht) where hs ∈ {0, 1} is the click or no click event re-
ceived by the algorithm at round s. LetCt be the indicator function of the event “round t is bid-independent”.
Define the bid-independent history as Ĥt = (ĥ1, ĥ2 , . . . , ĥt), where ĥt = htCt. For any exploration-
separated deterministic allocation rule and each round t, the bid-independent history Ĥt−1 and the bids
completely determine which arm is chosen in this round. Moreover, Ĥt−1 alone (without the bids) com-
pletely determines whether round t is bid-independent, and if so, which arm is chosen in this round.
Recall the CTR vectors ~µi as defined in Section 4. Let p and q be the distributions induced on ĤT by
~µ0 and ~µ1, respectively. Let pt and qt be the distributions induced on ĥt by ~µ0 and ~µ1, respectively. Let
Ht the support of Ĥt, i.e. the set of all t-bit vectors. In the forthcoming applications of Theorem 4.4, the
universe will be U = HT . By abuse of notation, we will treat Ĥt as a projection HT → Ht, so that it can
be considered a random variable under p or q.
Claim 4.5. D(p‖q) = Ep F (p; q| Ĥt) +
∑t
s=1Ep F (ps; qs| Ĥs−1) for any t > 1.
Proof. Use induction on t ≥ 0 (set Ĥ0 = 1). In order to obtain the claim for a given t assuming that it holds
for t− 1, apply Theorem 4.4(i) with Y = Ĥt−1 and Z = ĥt.
Claim 4.6. F (pt; qt| Ĥt−1) ≤ 4ǫ2 Ct 1{At=1} for each round t.
Proof. We are interested in the function F = F (pt; qt| Ĥt−1) : HT → R. Given Ĥt−1, one of the following
three cases occurs:
• round t is not bid-independent. Then ĥt = 0, hence F (·) = 0 by Theorem 4.4(iii),
• round t is bid-independent and arm 1 is not selected. Then ĥt is distributed as a fair coin under both
p and q, so again F (·) = 0.
• round t is bid-independent and arm 1 is selected. Then F (·) ≤ 4ǫ2 by Theorem 4.4(iv).
Given the full bid-independent history ĤT , p and q become (the same) point measure, so by Theo-
rem 4.4(iii) Ep F (p; q| ĤT ) = 0. Therefore taking Claim 4.5 with t = T we obtain
D(p‖q) =
T∑
t=1
Ep F (pt; qt| Ĥt−1) = 4ǫ2
T∑
t=1
Ep [Ct 1{At=1}] = 4ǫ
2 Ep[N1]. (4.2)
For a given round t and fixed bids, the allocation at round t is completely determined by the bid-independent
history Ĥt−1. Thus, we can treat {At ∈ S} as an event in HT . Now (4.1) follows from (4.2) via an
application of Theorem 4.4(ii) with U ′ = {At ∈ S}.
4.2 Lower bound for non-scalefree allocations
In this subsection we derive a regret lower bound for deterministic truthful mechanisms without assuming
that the allocations are scale-free. In particular, for two agents there are no assumptions. This lower bound
holds for any k (the number of agents) assuming that the allocation satisfies IIA, but unlike the one in
Theorem 4.1 it does not depend on k.
Theorem 4.7. Consider the stochastic MAB mechanism design problem with k agents. Let (A,P) be a
normalized truthful mechanism such that A is a non-degenerate deterministic allocation rule. Suppose A
satisfies IIA. Then its regret is R(T ; vmax) = Ω(vmax T 2/3) for any sufficiently large vmax.
Let us sketch the proof. Fix an allocation A. In Definition 3.3, if round t is (b, ρ) influential, for some
click realization ρ and bid vector b, an agent i is called strongly influenced by round t if it is one of the
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two agents that are “influenced” by round t but is not the “influencing agent” of round t. In particular, it
holds that A(b, ρ, t) 6= i. For each click realization ρ, round t and agent i, if there exists a bid vector b
such that round t is (b, ρ)-influential with strongly influenced agent i, then fix any one such b, and define
b∗i = b
∗
i (ρ, t) := maxj 6=i bj . Let us define B∗A = maxρ,t,i b∗i (ρ, t), where the maximum is taken over all
click realizations ρ, all rounds t, and all agents i. Let us say that round t is B∗-free from agent i w.r.t click
realization ρ, if for this click realization the following property holds: agent i is not selected in round t as
long as each bid is at least B∗.
Lemma 4.8. In the setting of Theorem 4.7, for any click realization ρ, any influential round t is B∗A-free
from some agent w.r.t. ρ.
Proof. Fix click realization ρ. Since round t is influential, for some bid profile b and agent i it is (b, ρ)-
influential with a strongly influenced agent i. By definition of b∗i (ρ, t), without loss of generality each bid in
b (other than i’s bid) is at most b∗i (ρ, t) ≤ B∗A. Then A(b, ρ, t) 6= i, and round t is (b, ρ)-secured from agent
i.
Suppose round t is not B∗A-free from agent i w.r.t ρ. Then there exists a bid profile b′ in which each bid
(other than i’s bid) is at least B∗A such that A(b′, ρ, t) = i. To derive a contradiction, let us transform b to
b′ by adjusting first the bid of agent i and then bids of agents j 6= i one agent at a time. Initially agent i is
not chosen in round t, and after the last step of this transformation agent i is chosen. Thus it is chosen at
some step, say when we adjust the bid of agent i or some agent j 6= i. This transfer of impression to agent
i cannot happen when bid of agent i is adjusted from bi to b′i (since round t is (b; ρ)-secured from i), and
it cannot happen when bid of agent j 6= i is adjusted from bj to b′j ≥ bj (this is because, the transfer to i
cannot happen from j because of pointwise-monotonicity and the transfer to i cannot happen from l 6= j
because of IIA). This is a contradiction.
Let T be the time horizon. Assume vmax ≥ 2B∗A. Let N(ρ) be the number of influential rounds w.r.t
click realization ρ. Let Ni(ρ) be the number of influential rounds w.r.t. click realization ρ that are B∗A-free
from agent i w.r.t. ρ. Then N and the Ni’s are random variables in the probability space induced by the
clicks. By Lemma 4.8 we have that
∑
iNi(ρ) is at least the number of influential rounds. As in Section 4,
let ~µ0 be the vector of CTRs in which all CTRs are 12 , and let E0[·] denote expectation w.r.t. ~µ0.
Fix a constant β > 0 to be specified later. If E0[N ] ≥ βk T 2/3 then E0[Ni] ≥ β T 2/3 for some agent
i, so the allocation incurs expected regret R(T ; vmax) ≥ Ω(vmax T 2/3) on any problem instance Jj , j 6= i.
(In this problem instance, CTRs given by ~µ0, the bid of agent j is vmax, and all other bids are vmax/2.) Now
suppose E0[N ] ≤ βk T 2/3. Then the desired regret bound follows by an argument very similar to the one in
the last paragraph of the proof of Theorem 4.1.
4.3 Universally truthful randomized MAB mechanisms
Consider randomized mechanisms that are universally truthful, i.e. truthful for each realization of the inter-
nal random seed. Our goal here is to extend the Ω(vmax T 2/3) regret bounds for deterministic mechanisms
to universally truthful randomized mechanisms, under relatively mild assumptions.
Note that lower bounds on regret for universally truthful MAB mechanisms do not immediately follow
from those for deterministic truthful MAB mechanisms. To see this, consider a randomized MAB mecha-
nism A that randomizes over some deterministic truthful mechanisms, each with regret at least R. Then for
each deterministic mechanism A′ in the support of A there is a problem instance on which A′ has regret at
least R; it could be a different problem instance for different A′. Whereas to lower-bound the regret of A
we need to provide one problem instance with high regret in expectation over all A′.
We consider mechanisms that randomize over exploration-separated deterministic allocation rules. As
per the discussion above, it does not suffice to quote Theorem 4.1; instead, we need to extend its proof.
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Lemma 4.9. Consider the MAB mechanism design problem. Let D be a distribution over exploration-
separated deterministic allocation rules. Then
EA∈D [RA(T ; vmax)] = Ω(vmax k
1/3 T 2/3).
Proof. Recall that in the proof of Theorem 4.1 we define a family F of 2k problem instances, and show
that if A is an exploration-separated deterministic allocation rule, then on one of these instances its regret
is “high”. In fact, we can extend this analysis to show that the regret is “high”, that is at least R∗ =
Ω(vmax k
1/3 T 2/3), on an instance I ∈ F chosen uniformly at random from F ; here regret is in expectation
over the choice of I . 17 Once this is proved, it follows that regret is R∗/2 for any distribution over such
A, in expectation over both the choice of A and the choice of I . Thus there exists a single (deterministic)
instance I such that EA∈D [RA,I(T )] ≥ R∗/2.
Theorem 4.3 can be extended similarly.
5 A matching upper bound
Let us describe a very simple mechanism, called the naive MAB mechanism, which matches the lower bound
from Theorem 4.1 up to polylogarithmic factors (and also the lower bound from Theorem 4.3, for γ = λ = 23
and constant δ).
Fix the number of agents k, the time horizon T , and the bid vector b. The mechanism has two phases.
In the exploration phase, each agent is selected for T0 := k−2/3 T 2/3(log T )1/3 rounds, in a round robin
fashion. Let ci be the number of clicks on agent i in the exploration phase. In the exploitation phase, an agent
i∗ ∈ argmaxi cibi is chosen and selected in all remaining rounds. Payments are defined as follows: agent i∗
pays maxi∈[k]\{i∗} cibi/ci∗ for every click she gets in exploitation phase, and all others pay 0. (Exploration
rounds are free for every agent.) This completes the description of the mechanism.
Lemma 5.1. Consider the stochastic MAB mechanism design problem with k agents. The naive mechanism
is normalized, truthful and has worst-case regret R(T ; vmax) = O(vmax k1/3 T 2/3 log2/3 T ).
Proof. The mechanism is truthful by a simple second-price argument.18 Recall that ci is the number of
clicks i got in the exploration phase. Let pi = maxj 6=i cjbj/ci be the price paid (per click) by agent i if she
wins (all) rounds in exploitation phase. If vi ≥ pi, then by bidding anything greater than pi agent i gains
vi−pi utility each click irrespective of her bid, and bidding less than vi, she gains 0, so bidding vi is weakly
dominant. Similarly, if vi < pi, then by bidding anything less than pi she gains 0, while bidding bi > pi,
she loses bi − pi each click. So bidding vi is weakly dominant in this case too.
For the regret bound, let (µ1 , . . . , µk) be the vector of CTRs, and let µ¯i = ci/T0 be the sample CTRs.
By Chernoff bounds, for each agent i we have Pr [|µ¯i − µi| > r] ≤ T−4, for r =
√
8 log(T )/T0. If in
a given run of the mechanism all estimates µ¯i lie in the intervals specified above, call the run clean. The
expected regret from the runs that are not clean is at most O(vmax), and can thus be ignored. From now on
let us assume that the run is clean.
The regret in the exploration phase is at most k T0 vmax = O(vmax k1/3 T 2/3 log1/3 T ). For the ex-
ploitation phase, let j = argmaxi µibi. Then (since we assume that the run is clean) we have
(µi∗ + r) bi∗ ≥ µ¯i∗ bi∗ ≥ µ¯j bj ≥ (µj − r) bj ,
17This extension requires but minor modifications to the proof of Theorem 4.1. For instance, for the case k ≥ 3 we argue that
first, if E0[N ] > R then E0[Ni] ≤ 2kE0[N ] for at least
k
2
agents i (and so on), and if E0[N ] ≤ R then (omitting some details)
there are Ω(k) good agents i such that E0[Ni] ≤ 2R/k (and so on).
18Alternatively, one can use Theorem 1.5 since all exploration rounds are bid-independent, and only exploration rounds are
influential, and the payments are exactly as defined in Theorem 3.1.
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which implies µjvj −µi∗vi∗ ≤ r(vj + vi∗) ≤ 2r vmax. Therefore, the regret in exploitation phase is at most
2r vmax T = O(vmax k
1/3 T 2/3 log2/3 T ). Therefore the total regret is as claimed.
6 Randomized allocations and adversarially chosen clicks
In this section we discuss randomized allocations. We apply them to a version of the MAB mechanism
design problem in which clicks are generated adversarially.19 The objective is to optimize the worst-case
regret over all values v = (v1 , . . . , vk) such that vi ∈ [0, vmax] for each i, and all click realizations ρ:
R(T ; v; ρ) =
[
maxi vi
∑T
t=1ρi(t)
]
−∑Tt=1∑ki=1 vi ρi(t) E [Ai(v; ρ; t)] (6.1)
R(T ; vmax) = max{R(T ; v; ρ) : all click realizations ρ, all v such that vi ∈ [0, vmax] for each i}.
The first term in (6.1) is the social welfare from the best time-invariant allocation, the second term is the
social welfare generated by A.
Let us make a few definitions related to truthfulness. Recall that a mechanism is called weakly truthful
if for each click realization, it is truthful in expectation over its random seed. A randomized allocation is
pointwise monotone if for each click realization and each bid profile, increasing the bid of any one agent
does not decrease the probability of this agent being allocated in any given round. For a set S of rounds
and a function σ : S → {agents}, an allocation is (S, σ)-separated if (i) it coincides with σ on S, (ii)
the clicks from the rounds not in S are discarded (not reported to the algorithm). An allocation is strongly
separated if before round 1, without looking at the bids, it randomly chooses a set S of rounds and a function
σ : S → {agents}, and then runs a pointwise monotone (S, σ)-separated allocation. Note that the choice of
S and σ is independent of the clicks, by definition.
We obtain a structural result: for any (randomized) strongly separated allocation rule A there exists a
mechanism that is normalized and weakly truthful.
Lemma 6.1. Consider the MAB mechanism design problem. Let A be a (randomized) strongly separated
allocation rule. Then there exists a payment rule P such that the resulting mechanism (A,P) is normalized
and weakly truthful.
We consider PSIM [8, 28], a randomized MAB algorithm from the literature which we here interpret
as an MAB allocation rule. It follows from [8, 28], that PSIM has strong regret guarantees for the adver-
sarial MAB mechanism design problem: it obtains regret R(T, vmax) = O(vmax k1/3 (log k)1/3 T 2/3). In
Section 6.1 we state PSIM and show that it is strongly separated. Thus, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 6.2. There exists a weakly truthful normalized mechanism for the adversarial MAB problem
(against oblivious adversary) whose regret grows as O((k log k)1/3 · T 2/3 · vmax).
Remark. For the adversarial MAB problem (i.e., without the restriction of truthfulness), the regret bound can
be improved to O˜(
√
kT · vmax) [7, 5]. However, the algorithms that achieve this bound do not immediately
yield MAB allocation rules that are strongly separated. It is an open question whether the regret bound in
Corollary 6.2 can be improved.
Proof of Lemma 6.1: Throughout the proof, let us fix a click realization ρ, time horizon T , bid vector b,
and agent i. We will consider the payment of agent i. We will vary the bid of agent i on the interval [0, bi];
the bids b−i of all other agents always stay the same.
19We focus on the oblivious adversary which (unlike the more difficult “adaptive adversary”) specifies all clicks in advance.
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Let ci(x) be the number of clicks received by agent i given that her bid is x. Then by (the appropriate
version of) Theorem 3.1 the payment of agent i must be Pi(b) such that
EA[Pi(b)] = EA
[
bi ci(bi)−
∫ bi
x=0 ci(x) dx
]
, (6.2)
where the expectation is taken over the internal randomness in the algorithm.
Recall that initially A randomly selects, without looking at the bids, a set S of rounds and a function
σ : S → {agents}, and then runs some pointwise monotone (S, σ)-separated allocation A(S,σ). In what
follows, let us fix S and σ, and denote A∗ = A(S,σ). We will refer to the rounds in S as exploration
rounds, and to the rounds not in S as exploitation rounds. Let γ∗i (x, t) be the probability that algorithm A∗
allocates agent i in round t given that agent i bids x. Note that for fixed value of internal random seed of
A∗ this probability can only depend on the clicks observed in exploration rounds, which are known to the
mechanism. Therefore, abstracting away the computational issues, we can assume that it is known to the
mechanism. Define the payment rule as follows: in each exploitation round t in which agent i is chosen and
clicked, charge
P∗i (b, t) = bi −
1
γ∗i (bi, t)
∫ bi
0
γ∗i (x, t) dx. (6.3)
Then the total payment assigned to agent i is
P∗i (b) =
∑
t6∈S ρi(t) A∗i (b; ρ; t) P∗i (b, t). (6.4)
Since allocation A∗ is pointwise monotone, the probability γ∗i (x, t) is non-decreasing in x. Therefore
P∗i (b, t) ∈ [0, bi] for each round t. It follows that the mechanism is normalized (for any realization of the
random seed of allocation A).
It remains to check that the payment rule (6.3) results in (6.2). Let c∗i (x) be the number of clicks
allocated to agent i by allocation A∗ given that her bid is x. Let cexpli (x) be the corresponding number of
clicks in exploitation rounds only. Since A∗ is (S, σ)-separated, we have
E[c∗i (x)− cexpli (x)] =
∑
t∈S ρσ(t)(t) = const(x). (6.5)
Taking expectations in (6.4) over the random seed of AS and using (6.5), we obtain
E[P∗i (b)] =
∑
t6∈S ρi(t) γ
∗
i (bi, t) P∗i (b, t)
=
∑
t6∈S ρi(t)
[
bi γ
∗
i (bi, t)−
∫ bi
0 γ
∗
i (x, t) dx
]
= bi
[∑
t6∈S ρi(t) γ
∗
i (bi, t)
]
− ∫ bi0 [∑t6∈S ρi(t) γ∗i (x, t)] dx
= bi E [c
expl
i (bi)]−
∫ bi
0 E[c
expl
i (x)] dx
= E
[
bi c
∗
i (bi)−
∫ bi
0 c
∗
i (x) dx
]
.
Finally, taking expectations over the choice of S and σ, we obtain (6.2).
6.1 Algorithm PSIM is strongly separated
In this subsection we interpret PSIM [8, 28] as an MAB allocation rule and show that it is strongly separated
(which implies Theorem 6.2). For the sake of completeness, we present PSIM below. As usual, k denotes
the number of agents; let [k] denote the set of agents.
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Input: Time horizon T , bid vector b. Let vmax = maxi bi.
Output: For each round t ≤ T , a distribution on [k].
1. Divide the time horizon into P phases of T/P consecutive rounds each.
2. From rounds of each phase p, pick without replacement k rounds at random (called the exploration
rounds) and assign them randomly to k arms. Let S denote the set of all exploration rounds (of all
phases). Let f : S → [k] be the function which tells which arm is assigned to an exploration round in
S. The rounds in [T ] \ S are called the exploitation rounds.
3. Let wi(0) = 1 for all i ∈ [k].
4. For each phase p = 1, 2, . . . , P
(a) For each round t in phase p
i. If t ∈ S and f(t) = i, then define the distribution γ(b; t;S, f) such that γi(b; t;S, f) = 1.
Pick an agent according to this distribution (equivalently, pick agent i), observe the click
ρi(t), and update wi(p) multiplicatively,
wi(p) = wi(p− 1) · (1 + ǫ)ρi(t)bi/vmax .
ii. If t 6∈ S, then define the distribution γ(b; t;S, f) such that γi(b; t;S, f) = wi(p−1)∑
j wj(p−1)
. Pick
an agent according to γ(b; t;S, f), observe the feedback, and discard the feedback.
Regret. If we pick the values ǫ = (k log k/T )1/3 and P = (log k)1/3(T/k)2/3, then the regret of PSIM is
bounded by O((k log k)1/3T 2/3vmax) against any oblivious adversary (see [8, 28]).
Claim 6.3. PSIM is strongly-separated.
Proof. It is clear from the structure of PSIM above that it chooses a set S of exploration rounds and a
function f : S → [k] in the beginning without looking at the bids and then runs an (S, f)-separated
allocation. We need to prove that the (S, f)-separated allocation is pointwise monotone. For this we need
prove that the probability γi(b; t;S, f) is monotone in the bid of agent i, where γi(b; t;S, f) denotes the
probability of picking agent i in round t when bids are b given the choice of S and f . If t ∈ S, the
γi(b; t;S, f) is independent of bids, and hence is monotone in bi. Let t 6∈ S and t is a round in phase p. Let
us denote by f−1(i, p) the (unique) exploration round in phase p assigned to agent i. We then have
γi(b; t;S, f) = (1 + ǫ)
bi
vmax
∑p−1
q=1 ρi(f
−1(i,q))
/∑
j
(1 + ǫ)
bj
vmax
∑p−1
q=1 ρj(f
−1(j,q)).
We split the denominator into the term for agent i and all other terms. It is then not hard to see that this is a
non-decreasing function of bi.
7 Truthfulness in expectation over CTRs
We consider the stochastic MAB mechanism design problem under a more relaxed notion of truthfulness:
truthfulness in expectation, where for each vector of CTRs the expectation is taken over clicks (and the
internal randomness in the mechanism, if the latter is not deterministic).20 We show that any MAB allocation
A∗ that is monotone in expectation, can be converted to an MAB mechanism that is truthful in expectation
and normalized in expectation, with minor changes and a very minor increase in regret. As discussed in the
Introduction, this result rules out a natural lower-bounding approach.
20 Normalized-in-expectation and monotone-in-expectation properties are defined similarly. An allocation rule is monotone in
expectation if for each agent i and fixed bid profile b−i, the corresponding expected click-allocation is a non-decreasing function
of bi. A mechanism is normalized in expectation if in expectation each agent is charged an amount between 0 and her bid for each
click she receives. In both cases, the expectation is taken over the clicks and possibly the allocation’s random seed.
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Remark. The follow-up work [9] has established that there exist MAB allocations that are monotone in
expectation whose regret matches the optimal upper bounds for MAB algorithms. In fact, [9] defined a
rather natural class of “well-formed MAB algorithms” that, e.g., includes (a version of) algorithm UCB1 [6],
and proved that any algorithm in this class gives rise to a monotone-in-expectation MAB allocation.
We will show that for any allocation A∗ that is monotone in expectation, any time horizon T , and any
parameter γ ∈ (0, 1) there exists a mechanism (A,P) such that the mechanism is truthful in expectation and
normalized in expectation, and allocation A initially makes a random choice between A∗ and some other
allocation, choosing A∗ with probability at least γ. We call such allocation A a γ-approximation of A∗.
Clearly, on any problem instance we have RA(T ) ≤ γ RA∗(T ) + (1 − γ)T . The extra additive factor of
(1 − γ)T is not significant if e.g. γ = 1 − 1T . The problem with this mechanism is that it is not ex-post
normalized; moreover, in some click realizations payments may be very large in absolute value.
Theorem 7.1. Consider the stochastic MAB mechanism design problem with k agents and a fixed time
horizon T . For each γ ∈ (0, 1) and each allocation rule A∗ that is monotone in expectation, there exists
a mechanism (A,P) such that A is a γ-approximation of A∗, and the mechanism is truthful in expectation
and normalized in expectation.
Remark. The key idea is to view the Myerson payments (see Theorem 3.1) as multivariate polynomials
over the CTRs, and argue that any such polynomial can be “implemented” by a suitable payment rule. The
payment rule P will be well-defined as a mapping from histories to numbers; we do not make any claims
on the efficient computability thereof.
Proof. Let Aexpl be the allocation rule where in each round an agent is chosen independently and uniformly
at random. Allocation A is defined as follows: use A∗ with probability γ; otherwise use Aexpl. Fix an
instance (b, µ) of the stochastic MAB mechanism design problem, where b = (b1 , . . . , bk) and µ =
(µ1 , . . . , µk) are vectors of bids and CTRs, respectively. Let Ci = Ci(bi; b−i) be the expected number of
clicks for agent i under the original allocation A∗. Then by Myerson [38] the expected payment of agent i
must be
PMi = γ
[
bi Ci(bi; b−i)−
∫ bi
0 Ci(x; b−i) dx
]
. (7.1)
We treat the expected payment as a multivariate polynomial over µ1 , . . . , µk.
Claim 7.2. PMi is a polynomial of degree ≤ T in variables µ1 , . . . , µk.
Proof. Fix the bid profile. Let Xt be allocation of algorithm A∗. Let poly(T ) be the set of all polynomials
over µ1 , . . . , µk of degree at most T . Consider a fixed history h = (x1, y1; . . . ;xT , yT ), and let ht be the
corresponding history up to (and including) round t. Then
P[h] =
∏T
t=1 Pr[Xt = xt |ht−1] µytxt (1− µxt)1−yt ∈ poly(T ) (7.2)
Ci(bi; b−i) =
∑
h∈H P[h] #clicksi(h) ∈ poly(T ). (7.3)
Therefore PMi ∈ poly(T ), since one can take an integral in (7.1) separately over the coefficient of each
monomial of Ci(x; b−i).
Fix time horizon T . For a given run of an allocation rule, the history is defined as h = (x1, y1; . . . ;xT , yT ),
where xt is the allocation in round t, and yt ∈ {0, 1} is the corresponding click. Let H be the set of all
possible histories.
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Our payment rule P is a deterministic function of history. For each agent i, we define the payment Pi =
Pi(h) for each history h such that Eh[Pi(h)] = PMi for any choice of CTRs, and hence Eh[Pi(h)] ≡ PMi ,
where ≡ denotes an equality between polynomials over µ1 , . . . , µk.
Fix the bid vector and fix agent i. We define the payment Pi as follows. Charge nothing if allocation
A∗ is used. If allocation Aexpl is used, charge per monomial. Specifically, let mono(T ) be the set of all
monomials over µ1 , . . . , µk of degree at most T . For each monomial Q ∈ mono(T ) we define a subset of
relevant histories Hi(Q) ⊂ H. (We defer the definition till later in the proof.) For a given history h ∈ H
we charge a (possibly negative) amount
Pi(h) = 11−γ
∑
Q∈mono(T ): h∈Hi(Q)
kdeg(Q) PMi (Q), (7.4)
where deg(Q) is the degree of Q, and PMi (Q) is the coefficient of Q in PMi . Let Pexpl be the distribution on
histories induced by Aexpl. Then the expected payment is
Eh[Pi(h)] =
∑
Q∈mono(T ) k
deg(Q)
Pexpl[Hi(Q)] PMi (Q).
Therefore in order to guarantee that Eh[Pi(h)] ≡ PMi it suffices to choose Hi(Q) for each Q so that
kdeg(Q) Pexpl[Hi(Q)] ≡ Q. (7.5)
Consider a monomial Q = µα11 . . . µ
αk
k . Let Hi(Q) consist of all histories such that first agent 1 is selected
α1 times in a row, and clicked every time, then agent 2 is selected α2 times in a row, and clicked every time,
and so on till agent k. In the remaining T − deg(Q) rounds, any agent can be chosen, and any outcome
(click or no click) can be received. It is clear that (7.5) holds.
8 Open questions
Despite the exciting developments in the follow-up work [9, 56, 22, 48] (discussed in Section 1.3), MAB
mechanisms are not well-understood. Below is a snapshot of the open questions, current as of this writing.
Impossibility results for deterministic MAB mechanisms.
1. For deterministic MAB mechanisms with k > 2 agents, is it possible to obtain lower bounds on regret
for weakly separated MAB allocation rules, without assuming IIA?
2. We conjecture that the “informational obstacle” – insufficient observable information to compute
payments – can be meaningfully extended to a very general class of mechanisms in which an alloca-
tion rule interacts with the environment. As mentioned in Section 1.3, the follow-up work [56, 48]
suggested settings other than MAB mechanisms in which this obstacle arises. To conclude that the
“informational obstacle” is prominent in a given setting, one needs to prove that unrestricted payment
computation makes truthful mechanisms strictly more powerful.
3. Surprisingly, we still do not understand the limitations of deterministic truthful-in-expectation mecha-
nisms. While, according to [9], there exist regret-optimal MAB allocation rules that are deterministic
and monotone-in-expectation (e.g., the allocation rule based on UCB1), it is not clear whether any such
allocation rule can be extended to a deterministic truthful-in-expectation MAB mechanism.
4. It would be interesting to analyze a slightly more permissive model in which an MAB mechanism
can decide to “skip” a round without displaying an ad. In particular, in such model we could trivially
extend the lower bounds on regret from the special case of k = 2 agents to k > 2 agents. However,
our negative results for two agents do not immediately extend to this new model, and moreover the
structural results for k > 2 agents do not immediately follow either.
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Randomized MAB mechanisms.
1. Recall that the “BKS reduction” from Babaioff, Kleinberg and Slivkins [9] exhibits a tradeoff between
variance in payments and loss in performance. Since the variance in payments can be very high,
optimizing this tradeoff is crucial.
This question is not resolved by the worst-case optimality result in Wilkens and Sivan [56]. While no
other reduction can achieve a better tradeoff for all monotone MAB allocation rules simultaneously,
the result in [56] does not rule out a reduction with better tradeoff for some monotone MAB allocation
rules, and therefore it does not rule out an MAB mechanism with better tradeoff. Furthermore, it is
possible that an MAB mechanism with optimal tradeoff cannot be represented as a reduction from a
regret-optimal allocation rule, in which case results about reductions simply do not apply.
2. Consider weakly truthful MAB mechanisms in the setting with adversarially chosen clicks.21 The
weakly truthful MAB mechanism in the present paper achieves regret O˜(k1/3 T 2/3), whereas the best
known MAB algorithms achieve regret O(
√
kT ) [7, 5]. It is not clear what should be the tight regret
bound. In particular, neither our reduction in Section 6 nor the BKS reduction from [9] immediately
apply to the algorithms in [7, 5].
3. More generally, as discussed in Section 1.2, pay-per-click ad auctions motivate many other versions
of the MAB mechanism design problem, corresponding to the various MAB settings studied in the
literature. For every such version one could compare the performance of weakly truthful MAB mech-
anisms with that of the best MAB algorithms. The positive direction here reduces (using the BKS
reduction) to designing weakly monotone MAB allocations. This type of question is a new angle in
the MAB literature, see [50] for a self-contained account.
Multi-slot MAB mechanisms: pay-per-click auctions with multiple ad slots and unknown CTRs.
1. Intuitively it seems that the negative results from this paper should extend to the setting with two or
more ad slots. However, the precise characterization results and regret bounds remain elusive. Also,
such results would probably depend on the specific multi-slot model, i.e. on on how clicks in different
slots are correlated, and how CTRs of the same ad in different slots are related to one another.
2. Recall that Gatti, Lazaric and Trovo [22] provide truthful multi-slot MAB mechanisms based on the
simple MAB mechanism presented in this paper and (independently) in Devanur and Kakade [17].
It remains to be seen if one can obtain weakly truthful mechanisms with better regret, e.g. using a
more efficient multi-slot MAB algorithm with an extension of the BKS reduction. Note that even the
algorithmic (i.e., non-strategic) version of multi-slot MAB is not fully understood.
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Appendix A: Proof of Lemma 3.9
In this section we present the full proof of Lemma 3.9. Recall that the “only if” direction is a conse-
quence of Observation 3.5. We focus on the “if” direction.
For bid profile b, click realization ρ, agent l and round t, the tuple (b; ρ; l; t) is called an influence-tuple
if round t is (b, ρ)-influential with influencing agent l. Suppose allocation A is weakly separated but not
exploration-separated. Then there is a counterexample: an influence-tuple (b; ρ; l; t) such that round t is not
bid-independent w.r.t. click realization ρ. We prove that such counterexample can occur only if bl ∈ Sl(b−l),
for some finite set Sl(b−l) ⊂ R that depends only on b−l.
Proposition A.1. LetA be as in Lemma 3.9. AssumeA is weakly separated. Then for each agent l and each
bid profile b−l there exists a finite set Sl(b−l) ⊂ R with the following property: for each counterexample
(bl, b−l; ρ; l; t) it is the case that bl ∈ Sl(b−l).
Once this proposition is proved, we obtain a contradiction with the non-degeneracy of A. Indeed, sup-
pose (b; ρ; l; t) is a counterexample. Then (b; ρ; l; t) is an influence-tuple. Since A is non-degenerate, there
exists a non-degenerate interval I such that for each x ∈ I it holds that (x, b−l; ρ; l; t) is an influence-tuple,
and therefore a counterexample. Thus the set Sl(b−l) in Proposition A.1 cannot be finite, contradiction.
In the rest of this section we prove Proposition A.1. Fix a counterexample (b; ρ; l; t); let t′ > t be
the influenced round. In particular, A(b; ρ; t) = l (see 1 in Figure 1 on page 17; all boxed numbers will
refer to this figure). Then by the assumption there exist bids b′ such that A(b′; ρ; t) = i′ 6= l. We claim
that this implies that there exists a bid b+i′ > bi′ such that A(b+i′ , b−i′ ; ρ; t) = i′ (see 2 ). This is proven in
Lemma A.3 below, and in order to prove it we first present the following lemma, which essentially states
that if the mechanism makes a choice between i and j of who to be show, then it can only depend on the
ratio of their bids bidi/bidj , and not on the bids of other agents.
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Lemma A.2. Let A be an MAB (deterministic) allocation rule that is pointwise-monotone, scalefree, and
satisfies IIA. Let there be two bid profiles α and β such that A(α; ρ; t) ∈ {i, j}, A(β; ρ; t) ∈ {i, j}, and
αi/αj = βi/βj . Then it must be the case that A(α; ρ; t) = A(β; ρ; t).
Proof. As A is scalefree we assume that αi = βi and αj = βj by scaling bids in β by a factor of αi/βi (or
a factor of αj/βj), without changing the allocation.
Assume for the sake of a contradiction thatA(β; ρ; t) 6= A(α; ρ; t). Let us number the agents as follows.
Agents i and j are numbered 1 and 2, respectively. The rest of the agents are arbitrarily numbered 3 to k.
Consider the following sequence of bid vectors. α(1) = α(2) = α and α(m) = (βm, α(m − 1)−m) for
m ∈ {3, . . . , k}. As α(1) = α and α(k) = β, A(α(1); ρ; t) = A(α; ρ; t) and A(α(k); ρ; t) = A(β; ρ; t).
Since A(α(k); ρ; t) = A(β; ρ; t) 6= A(α; ρ; t) = A(α(1); ρ; t) there exists m ∈ {3, . . . , k} such that
A(α(m − 1); ρ; t) = A(α; ρ; t) ∈ {i, j} while A(α(m); ρ; t) 6= A(α(m− 1); ρ; t). As m 6= i and m 6= j,
IIA implies that A(α(m); ρ; t) = m and given that, IIA also implies that A(α(k); ρ; t) ∈ {m,m+1, . . . k}
(note that i, j are not in this set). But as A(α(k); ρ; t) = A(β; ρ; t) ∈ {i, j} this yields a contradiction.
Lemma A.3. Let A be an MAB (deterministic) allocation rule that is pointwise-monotone, scalefree, and
satisfies IIA. Let there be two bid profiles α and β such that A(α; ρ; t) = i and A(β; ρ; t) = j 6= i. Then
there exists β+i > βi such that A(β+i , β−i; ρ; t) = i.
In other words, if it is possible for i to get the impression in round t at all, then it is possible for her to
get the impression starting from any bid profile and raising her bid high enough.
Proof. We first note that αiαj ≥
βi
βj
. If not, then αiαj <
βi
βj
. Consider a raised bid of i from αi to α+i =
αj · βiβj . In the bid profile (α
+
i , α−i), i must get the impression (by pointwise monotonicity). This gives a
contradiction to Lemma A.2, since A(α+i , α−i; ρ; t) = i ∈ {i, j}, A(β; ρ; t) = j ∈ {i, j}, and α
+
i
αj
= βiβj ,
but A(α+i , α−i; ρ; t) 6= A(β; ρ; t).
Now, consider i increasing her bid in profile β to β+i = βj · αiαj . Now, A(α; ρ; t) = i ∈ {i, j},
A(β+i , β−i; ρ; t) ∈ {i, j} (from IIA), and αiαj =
β+i
βj
. We can apply Lemma A.2 to deduce that A(α; ρ; t) =
A(β+i , β−i; ρ; t) and both are equal to i since the first allocation is equal to i.
From the lemma above, it follows that agent i′ can increase her bid (in bid profile b) and get the im-
pression in click realization ρ, round t. To quantify by how much agent i′ needs to raise her bid to get the
impression, we introduce the notion of threshold Θi,j(ρ; t) in the next lemma.
Lemma A.4. Let A be an MAB (deterministic) allocation rule that is pointwise monotone, scalefree and
satisfies IIA. For click realization ρ, round t, two agents i and j 6= i, let bids b−i−j be such that there
exist x0 and y satisfying A(x0, y, b−i−j ; ρ; t) = j, and there exists x (possibly dependent on y) satisfying
A(x, y, b−i−j ; ρ; t) = i. Let us fix such a y and define22
Θ
b−i−j
i,j (ρ, t) =
1
y infx
{
x
∣∣ A(x, y, b−i; ρ; t) = i}.
Then for any bids b′−i−j , Θ
b′−i−j
i,j (ρ, t) is well defined and satisfies Θ
b′−i−j
i,j (ρ, t) = Θ
b−i−j
i,j (ρ, t). We denote it
by Θi,j(ρ, t), as Θ
b−i−j
i,j (ρ, t) is independent of b−i−j .
22Note that if there are no values of bids of i (x0 and x) and j (equal to y) such that j can get an impression with small enough
bid (x0) of agent i and i can get an impression by raising her bid (to x), then we don’t define Θb−i−ji,j (ρ; t) at all. We will be careful
not to use such undefined Θ’s. It is not hard to see that if bids are nonzero, then Θi,j(ρ; t) is defined if and only if Θj,i(ρ; t) is.
Moreover 0 < Θi,j(ρ; t) <∞, and Θj,i(ρ; t) = (Θi,j(ρ; t))−1.
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Proof. We first prove that if the conditions of the definition of Θb−i−ji,j (ρ; t) are satisfied for b−i−j , then are
also satisfied for any other b′−i−j . Let us say they are satisfied for b−i−j , that is there exists x0, x and y,
such that A(x0, y, b−i−j ; ρ; t) = j and A(x, y, b−i; ρ; t) = i. We want to prove existence of x′ and y′ for
b′−i−j . If A(x0, y, b′−i−j ; ρ; t) = j then existence of y′ is proved for b′−i−j too, since y′ = y works. If not,
then A(x0, y, b′−i−j ; ρ; t) = j′ 6= j and A(x0, y, b−i−j ; ρ; t) = j, and by Lemma A.3, there exists a y′ > y
such that A(x0, y′, b′−i−j ; ρ; t) = j. Once the existence of y′ is proved, we now prove the existence of x′.
Let x′ = x · y′y ≥ x. We have A(x, y, b−i−j ; ρ; t) = i ∈ {i, j} and A(x′, y′, b′−i−j ; ρ; t) ∈ {i, j} by IIA
(i can only transfer impression to her by changing her bid) and x′/y′ = x/y. From Lemma A.2, we get
i = A(x, y, b−i−j; ρ; t) = A(x′, y′, b′−i−j ; ρ; t). Hence the existence of x′ is proved too.
For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that θ := Θb−i−ji,j (ρ; t) < Θ
b′−i−j
i,j (ρ; t) =: θ
′
. Let us scale
the bids in (x′, y′, b′−i−j) by a factor such that the factor times y′ is equal to y. We can hence assume that
y′ = y. Let us pick a bid x′′ ∈ (θy, θ′y). We have A(x′′, y, b−i−j ; ρ; t) = i (since x′′/y is past the threshold
θ), A(x′′, y′ = y, b′−i−j ; ρ; t) = j (x′′/y′ is yet not past the threshold θ′), and x′′/y = x′′/y′. This is a
contradiction to the Lemma A.2. Therefore, θ = θ′.
We conclude that if b+i′ > bl ·Θi′,l(ρ, t) then A(b+i′ , b−i′ ; ρ; t) = i′ 6= l (see 2 again). Note that we are
using Θi′,l(ρ; t) since this is well-defined. Define ρ′ = ρ⊕ 1(l, t).
Let us think about decreasing the bid of agent l from bl (it is positive, since all bids are assumed to be
positive). When the bid of agent l is bl, she gets the impression in round t, but when her bid is small enough
(in particular as low as bi′/Θi′,l(ρ; t)), then she must not get the impression in round t (see Lemma A.2).
When the bid of l decreases, some other agent gets the impression in round t, let us call that agent i (note
that this agent may not be the same as agent i′ above). See 3 .
Now, starting from bid profile b, let us increase the bid of agent i. When the bid of agent i is large
enough (in particular as large as biΘi′,l(ρ; t)bl/bi′), then l can no longer get the impression in round t (see
Lemma A.2). From IIA, the impression must get transferred to i. Therefore we can define Θi,l(ρ; t), and
when b+i > blΘi,l(ρ; t), agent i gets the impression in round t (see 3 again). Note that A(b+i , b−i; ρ; t) =
A(b+i , b−i; ρ′; t) = i (click information for l at round t cannot influence the impression decision at round t).
Recall that t′ is the influenced round. Let A(b; ρ; t′) = j and let A(b; ρ′; t′) = j′ 6= j (see 4 ). As A is
pointwise monotone and IIA, A(b+i , b−i; ρ; t′) ∈ {i, j} and A(b+i , b−i; ρ′; t′) ∈ {i, j′}. It must be the case
that A(b+i , b−i; ρ; t′) = A(b+i , b−i; ρ′; t′), as l does not get an impression at round t (and the algorithm does
not see the difference between ρ and ρ′). As j′ 6= j we conclude that
A(b+i , b−i; ρ; t′) = A(b+i , b−i; ρ′; t′) = i.
Next we note that i 6= j and i 6= j′. This is because if i = j (respectively i = j′), then round t
would be (b; ρ)-influential (respectively (b; ρ′)-influential) with influenced agent i but it is not (b; ρ)-secured
(respectively (b; ρ′)-secured) from i, in contradiction to the assumption.
We also note that l ∈ {j, j′} (see 5 ). Assume for the sake of contradiction that l 6= j and l 6= j′. For
b−l < bi · Θl,i(ρ, t) it holds that A(b−l , b−l; ρ; t) = A(b−l , b−l; ρ′; t) = i (since i was defined such that i
gets the impression in round t when l decreases her bid) thus A(b−l , b−l; ρ; t′) = A(b−l , b−l; ρ′; t′) (as click
information for l at round t is not observed). (Also, as a side note, observe that b−l < bl by pointwise-
monotonicity since agent l was getting an impression in round t with bid bl and lost it when her bid is b−l .)
Let A(b−l , b−l; ρ; t′) = A(b−l , b−l; ρ′; t′) = l′. Note that l′ 6= l, since otherwise, Al(x, b−l; ρ; t′) is not a
monotone function of x: it is 0 when x = bl (since j gets an impression), and 1 when x = b−l < bl, a
contradiction to pointwise-monotonicity. Now, note that the impression in ρ′ at time t′ transfers from j′ to
l′, and impression in ρ at time t′ transfers from j to l′, none of which ({j, j′, l′}) are equal to l and j 6= j′.
Let us write this in equations:
A(bl, b−l; ρ; t′) = j A(b−l , b−l; ρ; t′) = l′
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A(bl, b−l; ρ′; t′) = j′ A(b−l , b−l; ρ′; t′) = l′.
It must be the case that either j 6= l′ or j′ 6= l′ (since j 6= j′). If j 6= l′, then in ρ at time t′, reducing the
bid of l transfers impression from j to l′ (both of them are different from l), thus violating IIA. Similarly, if
j′ 6= l′, then in ρ′ at time t′, reducing the bid of l transfers impression from j′ to l′ (both of them are different
from l), thus violating IIA. We thus have l ∈ {j, j′}. Let l = j′ (since otherwise, we can swap the roles of ρ
and ρ′).
To summarize what we have proved so far: there are 3 distinct agents i, j, l such that
A(b; ρ; t) = A(b; ρ′; t) = A(b; ρ′; t′) = l (since A(b; ρ′; t′) = j′ = l),
A(b; ρ; t′) = j and
A(b+i , b−i; ρ; t) = A(b+i , b−i; ρ; t′) = A(b+i , b−i; ρ′; t) = A(b+i , b−i; ρ′; t′) = i.
Observe also that Θi,l(ρ, t) = Θi,l(ρ′, t) as ρ and ρ′ only differ at a click at round t, and such a click cannot
determine the allocation decision at round t. Also, max{Θi,j(ρ, t′) · bj,Θi,l(ρ′, t′) · bl} ≤ Θi,l(ρ, t) · bl as
the allocation at round t′, which is different for ρ and ρ′ (at b), depends on l getting the impression at round
t.23 Finally we prove that Θi,j(ρ, t′) · bj= Θi,l(ρ′, t′) · bl (see 8 ).
Claim A.5. Θi,j(ρ, t′) · bj = Θi,l(ρ′, t′) · bl
Proof. First of all, note that Θi,j(ρ; t′) and Θi,l(ρ′, t′) are well-defined. Let b¯i = (Θi,j(ρ, t′)·bj+Θi,l(ρ′, t′)·
bl)/2. Consider the following two cases.
If Θi,j(ρ, t′) · bj < Θi,l(ρ′, t′) · bl then round t is (b¯i, b−i; ρ)-influential (as A(b¯i, b−i; ρ; t′) = i
and A(b¯i, b−i; ρ′; t′) = l) with influencing agent l (A(b¯i, b−i; ρ; t) = A(b¯i, b−i; ρ′; t) = l since b¯i <
Θi,l(ρ, t)·bl) and influenced agent i. Additionally, t it is not (b¯i, b−i; ρ)-secured from i (asA(b+i , b−i; ρ; t) =
A(b+i , b−i; ρ′; t) = i). A contradiction to first condition in the theorem.
Similarly, if Θi,j(ρ, t′)·bj > Θi,l(ρ′, t′)·bl then round t is (b¯i, b−i; ρ)-influential (as nowA(b¯i, b−i; ρ; t′) =
j and A(b¯i, b−i; ρ′; t′) = i) with influencing agent l and influenced agent i. Additionally, t it is not
(b¯i, b−i; ρ)-secured from i. Again, a contradiction to the first condition in the theorem.
The lemma implies that bl ∈ Sl(b−l), where a finite set Sl(b−l) is defined by
Sl(b−l) =
{
bj
Θi,j(ρ, t
′)
Θi,l(ρ′, t′)
: all agents i, j 6= l, all click realizations ρ, ρ′ and all t′ s.t. Θi,j(ρ, t
′)
Θi,l(ρ′, t′)
is well-defined
}
.
This completes the proof of Proposition A.1.
23In Figure 1 we defined b+ρi := Θi,j(ρ; t′)bj and b
+ρ′
i := Θi,l(ρ
′; t′)bl. These are the bids of agent i at which impression
transfers to her in round t′ in ρ and ρ′ respectively. See 6 and 7 in the figure.
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